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 The World Health Organization (WHO) serves as the health authority and leader of 
international emergency responses to health crises (Lee, 2009). The WHO was founded in 1948 
with twenty-two functions enshrined in its constitution (Clift, 2013:6). It evolved out of the 
International Sanitary Bureau, which later became the Pan-American Health Organization 
(PAHO) (Clift, 2013:6). The Office International d’Hygiène Publique was established in 1907, 
and following World War One, the League of Nations established its own parallel Health 
Organization alongside the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (Clift, 2013:6). Throughout 
its existence, the WHO infrastructure has evolved into a highly decentralized system with six 
regional offices and 150 country offices, one representing each WHO Member State (Yamey, 
2002:1170).  
 The WHO has responded to health crises with varying degrees of effectiveness. In 2014, 
there was an Ebola crisis in West Africa in which more than 11,000 people died (BBC News, 
2016a). The outbreak spread outside of West Africa with cases in the United States and Europe 
(BBC News, 2016a). The ongoing Zika outbreak began in 2015 in Colombia and Brazil. The 
associated clusters of microcephaly and Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) were officially 
recognized as a health emergency by the WHO in February, 2016 but later downgraded to a 
long-term public health issue in November, 2016. Microcephaly and GBS are neurological 
disorders thought to be related to Zika. Microcephaly is a congenital disorder where babies are 
born with smaller skulls and brains. Guillain-Barré syndrome on the other hand is not congenital 
but can be acquired and results in full or partial paralysis that can be temporary or long-term.  
 Although the WHO deemed both Ebola and the clusters of microcephaly and GBS related 
to Zika to be Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC), the WHO responded 
differently in each case. Under the International Health Regulations (2005), a PHEIC is defined 
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as “an extraordinary event” which constitutes a public health risk that has spread internationally, 
and requires a “coordinated international response” (WHO, 2017d). Broadly interpreted, it is a 
situation that is unexpected and has severe implications for public health within the state the 
outbreak originated and the public health of other Member States (WHO, 2017d). During the 
2014 Ebola outbreak, the WHO’s Director-General, Dr. Margaret Chan did not declare a PHEIC 
until August 8, 2014, after over one thousand people had died, despite having acknowledging 
eight months earlier that Ebola was a public health threat. Once the PHEIC entered into force, 
however, the WHO and Member States’ response escalated quickly, and garnered a significant 
amount of financial and human resources that even involved foreign military operations (London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2015). 
 In the most recent Zika outbreak, mainly affecting countries in Central and South America 
and the Caribbean, the initial recognition of a health crisis was more rapid, as cases of 
microcephaly surged in mid- to late-2015 in Central and South American countries. When Dr. 
Chan declared a PHEIC on February 1, 2016, there had been no reported Zika deaths, though 
Brazil and Colombia had in recent months observed an unprecedented increase in the number of 
babies being born with microcephaly and other neurological abnormalities (CDC, 2016j). The 
delivery of resources to affected countries, despite the WHO declaring the clusters of 
microcephaly and GBS related to Zika a PHEIC, has proven slow in comparison to the WHO’s 
response to Ebola in 2014 (Associated Press at the United Nations, 2014). The Zika response 
similarly did not receive the financial and human resources that the WHO and its Member States 
allocated to the Ebola response. No foreign militaries responded to the Zika outbreak, forcing 
Brazil to deploy its own military to conduct public education and outreach prevention. On 
November 18, 2016, the WHO announced that Zika no longer constituted a PHEIC, and instead 
 4 
urged Member States to recognize the long-term effects of Zika, such as life-long neurological 
complications, that necessitate a long-term strategy rather than a short-term emergency style 
response (Sun, 2016c). On the one hand, it seems obvious that the system would respond more 
quickly and with more resources to the more lethal of the two diseases. But the WHO did not 
respond more quickly. Why did the WHO respond so slowly to Ebola? On the other hand, the 
WHO responded quickly to Zika but the response did not have as many resources. What factors 
could explain the WHO’s response time and resources that the organization allocated to each 
response?  
 This thesis explores explanations for why the WHO and its Member States responded 
differently in each of the two cases. The epidemiology, securitization, and organizational theory 
literatures suggest three primary answers to these questions. I have used these literatures to 
formulate three explanations through which to examine each case. I assess the Ebola and Zika 
cases along two dependent variables: time from the start of the outbreak to the WHO and 
Member States’ response, and the amount of financial and human resources allocated to the 
response. The epidemiological explanation focuses on the lethality and transmissibility of each 
virus. In this explanation I examine whether a more lethal and easily transmissible virus results 
in a faster response that garners greater amounts of financial and human resources. Second, the 
securitization explanation examines whether the framing of each case as a security threat (or not) 
results in greater amounts of financial and human resources, even if such a process of 
securitizing disease occurs slowly. Finally, in the organizational structure explanation I examine 
the WHO’s decentralized structure and budgetary mechanisms to determine whether or not 
greater decentralization and voluntary contribution mechanisms in the WHO’s budget contribute 
to a slower response that sees fewer resources allocated to it.  
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 Epidemiological approaches suggest that the more lethal and easily transmissible the virus, 
the quicker the WHO and Member States respond and the greater the resources that are allocated 
to the response. Ebola was lethal and relatively but not highly transmissible. The response, while 
initially slow, received significant amounts of resources once the response began in August 
2014. Zika, being less lethal (but more easily transmissible via mosquitoes) is non-life 
threatening in most cases and thus has not seen a large inflow of resources. Zika, in comparison 
to Ebola, is a much more easily transmissible disease, which suggests that the WHO and 
Member States would respond more quickly to Zika and dedicate more resources to the response. 
This, however, was not the case as the WHO was quick to recognize the Zika outbreak but slow 
to allocate resources.  
 Securitization theory suggests that when a pandemic outbreak is framed as a security issue, 
it is elevated from normal politics to an existential threat that requires an equally proportionate 
response. This should result in greater resources allocated to the emergency response. I find that 
Ebola was framed as a security issue and garnered greater resources, including military 
resources. In contrast, there has been a dearth of resources allocated to the Zika response, despite 
the outbreak having been labelled a PHEIC in February 2016. The WHO revoked the PHEIC on 
November 18, 2016 and announced that the fight against Zika would be long-term and require 
resources to be spread out over a number of years rather than a number of months (Goldschmidt, 
2016b).  
 Finally, organization theory suggests that the speed of response and resources allocated 
hinges on the decentralization and funding of the WHO’s regional and country-level offices. The 
more decentralized the WHO’s organizational structure, and the more the budgeting mechanism 
allows Member States to voluntarily fund public health issues, and the less these contributions 
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are mandatory, the slower the response and the fewer resources allocated to the response. The 
WHO is a highly decentralized organization whose emergency response time and resource 
allocation capabilities are hindered by a spider web of regional and country offices that lacks 
clear lines of accountability and communication during emergencies. In the case of Ebola the 
African Regional Health Office (AFRO) was in charge of operations. AFRO, while having the 
largest budget of the six regional offices, spends almost none of its 2014-2015 budget on 
emergency response and preparedness and instead focuses voluntary-specified funds on special 
programs, such as polio eradication. The PAHO, conversely, has the smallest budget of the six 
regional offices, yet spends a greater percentage of its 2016-2017 budget on outbreak and crisis 
response. The PAHO receives additional funding from its private organization, the Pan-
American Health Organization.  
 In addition to testing variables from epidemiological approaches, securitization theory, and 
organizational theory, I find through my analysis that leadership emerges as a fourth independent 
variable that would be worthwhile exploring in future research. In the case of Ebola, the 
leadership within AFRO was irresponsive to communication from country offices and 
headquarters which contributed to a slower WHO and Member State response. Ebola, however, 
was securitized which prompted the WHO and its Member States to contribute resources to 
response efforts even though the leadership at the regional level failed to coordinate a timely and 
resource-rich response earlier on in the Ebola outbreak. Conversely, the leadership within the 
PAHO was proactive and responded to the Zika outbreak before WHO headquarters. The 
PAHO’s leadership helped galvanize a response and small amounts of financial resources in the 
absence of Zika being securitized. 
 In short, I find that securitization and the WHO’s budget mechanism interact to produce 
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the observed responses in each of my cases. The hypotheses concerning lethality and 
transmissibility did not produce conclusive predictions. The WHO’s decentralization remained 
the same in both case studies, meaning that the organizational structure hypotheses did not 
produce conclusive predictions. I find that as a disease becomes securitized over time it receives 
significantly more resources than non-securitized diseases.  When those resources are funneled 
through a budgetary mechanism, such as the voluntary contributions mechanism at the WHO, a 
securitized disease like Ebola will rapidly receive increased funding (but only after it is 
securitized).  The leadership, specifically at the regional office level in my two case studies, 
either impeded (in the case of Ebola) or expedited (in the case of Zika) the coordination of an 
emergency response and the amount of resources dedicated to the response. 
 The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss my research question and 
the puzzle that I am trying to address. Second, I outline the epidemiological, securitization, and 
organizational theory literatures. Third, I state my hypotheses and explain my chosen 
methodology of structured, focused comparison and process tracing. In this section I also explain 
why my chosen method offers the greatest insight into my two cases. The fourth section contains 
my detailed analysis of the two cases in which I explore the effect of each independent variable 
on the observed responses. In the conclusion I summarize my findings from the two case studies.  
 
The Research Question 
 The main question I address is why Ebola and Zika were treated differently by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and its Member States. Were these differences due to differences in 
lethality? Were they a result of socially constructed arguments by key securitizing actors, or did 
the differences arise from the organizational structure and budget of the WHO itself? Before 
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addressing the literature on the three approaches, I outline the facts of each case and then 
demonstrate that the facts of each case present an empirical puzzle requiring further analysis.  
 The Ebola virus outbreak started in Guinea in late December 2013 and spread to Liberia 
and Sierra Leone in early 2014 (Fox, 2014). The WHO was criticized for its slow response, as 
the world health authority declared a PHEIC on August 8, 2014 after over one thousand West 
Africans had died from Ebola. Once the WHO declared the PHEIC, WHO Member States 
contributed large amounts of financial and human resources to the emergency response 
operations. Only once Ebola was framed as a “security issue” was the PHEIC declared and did 
Member States commit significant resources to the response efforts. The situation in the three 
worst affected West African states (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) grew so dire that Western 
military forces were sent in to establish health clinics, provide training and supply personal 
protective equipment to local and foreign healthcare workers (WHO, 2015b:18). Between March 
2014 and April 22, 2016 the World Health Organization received more than $459 million to the 
WHO’s Ebola response efforts in West Africa (WHO, 2016a). This number includes donations 
from both Member States as voluntary contributions, bilateral funding from development 
organizations and other donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Wellcome 
Trust (WHO, 2016h). The first large scale donor was the regional African Development Bank 
Group that began a series of donations to the WHO on July 15, 2014. Other Member States and 
private organizations also began to donate in July, 2014 but most of these donations were no 
more than $1 million USD. These donations dramatically increased in size and number following 
the PHEIC declaration on August 8, 2014. After August 8, 2014, donations from Member States 
and other organizations were several millions of dollars and had increased in number from the 
initial donations before the PHEIC declaration (WHO, 2016a). For example, Japan donated 
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$300,000 USD on April 1, 2014, but on August 22, 2014 nearly tripled its first donation when 
the Japan donated $850,000 to the WHO in the form of voluntary contributions. Japan, along 
with many other WHO Member States, sent donations from their development agency and 
ministry of foreign affairs to the WHO after the PHEIC announcement on August 8 
(http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/funding/en/). None of the African Regional Office’s 
assessed contributions were reserved for crisis response, which left the regional office reliant on 
voluntary-specified contributions from WHO Member states and bilateral assistance from 
governments and other organizations (WHO, 2016k).  
 Zika, on the other hand, was quickly declared a PHEIC on February 2, 2016 after a rise in 
the number of babies born with microcephaly in Colombia and Brazil, the two worst affected 
countries in the WHO’s Americas region (PAHO, June 2016a). The WHO worked to establish a 
link between the uptick in microcephaly in newborns and the Zika virus, and eventually 
concluded that there was a definitive connection between the spread of Zika and the rising 
number of babies born with microcephaly (PAHO, June 2016a). Despite the WHO quickly 
declaring the clusters of microcephaly and GBS related to Zika a public health emergency, Zika 
poses little, to no threat to the majority of people who are infected (CDC, 2016g).  
 Since declaring a PHEIC in February 2016, the flow of financial and human resources to 
the worst-affected countries (Colombia and Brazil) has been slow and virtually non-existent 
(Arnett, 2016). Colombia and Brazil, along with other affected countries in the WHO’s Americas 
region, are reliant on their own national resources to manage the virus’ spread and cope with the 
long-term effects of the Zika virus (WHO, 2016e). In the United States, Congress was unwilling 
to allocate additional resources requested by President Barack Obama to combat the Zika virus 
(Fox, 2016; Kodjak, 2016). President Obama was forced to siphon off remaining funds from the 
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United States’ West African Ebola fund, leading to concerns that Ebola recovery efforts in West 
Africa would be undermined (Kodjak, 2016). Eventually, Congress agreed to fund $1.1 billion 
out of the $1.9 billion originally requested (Fox, 2016; Kodjak, 2016).  
The WHO requested $17,721,484 USD and received $2,338,084 USD, leaving a funding 
gap of $15,383,400 USD, while the PAHO received a meager $1,640,000 USD out of the 
$17,300,000 USD it had requested (WHO, 2016e:6; PAHO, 2016a:4). 
 
The Literature 
 I now turn to the literatures that inform the three explanations through which I assess the 
Ebola and Zika cases. There are three major International Relations (IR) literatures that relate to 
my research question. The first is the epidemiological literature on diseases. This body of 
literature is related to IR topics such as security and health, though the epidemiological literature 
is not a specific IR literature. The epidemiological literature provides a rational-actor explanation 
for the WHO and Member States’ response to Ebola and Zika. Second, the Copenhagen School’s 
securitization theory is useful for understanding how framing a pandemic as a security issue 
helps garner resources to a particular issue. The third approach is based on organizational theory. 
In this section I also highlight the principal-agent (PA) literature as PA theory is helpful for 
explaining how the length of delegation chains within or between organizations contributes to 
miscommunication and provides agent’s with greater autonomy from their principal.   
 
Epidemiological Approach- Rational actor model applied to public health issues 
 The epidemiological approach serves as the baseline expectation for the behavior of health 
actors in response to a disease outbreak. Two disease characteristics, lethality and transmission, 
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are most important for understanding why the WHO and Member States’ response to Ebola and 
to Zika differed in response time and resources allocated. Lethality of a virus is measured by the 
case fatality rate. Case fatality rate can only be measured once a pandemic is already occurring, 
as case fatality rates for the same virus often vary across different outbreaks. The case fatality 
rate is used as a measure of disease severity and is a good predictor of how many individuals will 
be infected in the future (Harrington, 2016). Case fatality rate is calculated by dividing the 
number of deaths from a specific disease over a given time period by the number of people 
diagnosed with the disease during the same time frame and then multiplied by one hundred to 
yield a percentage (Harrington, 2016).  
 The Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines transmissibility as the 
estimations of the basic reproductive number, R0. R0 is an epidemiological measurement that 
describes the reproductive rate of a virus and is used to measure the number of secondary 
infections that are produced by a typical case of a particular infection (Breban, Vardavas and 
Blower, 2007: e282). For example, if an R0 measurement for a given virus is 12, then one case 
of this virus produces 12 new cases. In the 2014 Ebola outbreak, the R0 was similar to previous 
Ebola pandemics in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, ranging between 1.5 and 
2.5 (CDC 2016h). The specific range for the reproductive number was between 1.51 and 2.53 
(CI 95%) across Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia meaning that one case of Ebola would 
produce between one to almost three new cases of Ebola (Althaus, 2014:1). The R0 for the 
current Zika outbreak is estimated to range from 3.0 to 6.6 depending on the epidemiologist’s 
location at the time of measuring R0, meaning that one case of Zika produces between 3 and 7 
new Zika virus cases (Nishimura et al., 2016: 274). Zika’s higher transmission rate is a result of 
it being transmissible by mosquitoes, as mosquitoes easily cross boundaries and are indifferent to 
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who they infect. 
 Looking at the lethality of the two viruses, we expect the response to Ebola to be quick and 
consist of a large amount of financial and human resources. We expect the response to Zika to be 
slow and resource-poor. Conversely, upon examining transmissibility, we would expect for the 
response to Zika to be quick and resource-rich, while the response to Ebola to be slow and 
resource-poor. The lethality of the virus may matter more in the amount of resources dedicated to 
an emergency response, while the transmissibility of a virus may matter for the speed of 
response. In reality, evidence suggests that the Ebola response is initially slow, but once the issue 
is securitized, the resources allocated to the response speed up. The WHO and its Member States 
respond quickly to Zika, although few resources are allocated to the emergency response even 
after the WHO declares Zika a PHEIC. The epidemiological explanation partially explains some 
of the responses to Ebola and Zika, yet it cannot explain why the large military and financial 
response to Ebola was slow or why the resource-poor response to Zika was so quick. Political 
explanations are necessary to explain the speed of response and amount of resources allocated to 
the response in each of my two case studies.  
 
 
Securitization Theory  
 At the heart of the constructivist literature developed by the Copenhagen School of 
International Relations is the “securitization” of phenomena through “speech acts” that frame a 
previously non-security issue as an emerging security threat (Waever, 1995). The Copenhagen 
School defines securitization as a “successful speech act through which an intersubjective 
understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential 
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threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal 
with the threat” (Buzan and Waever, 2003:49). Buzan and Waever (2003) elaborate on this 
framework as they specify that particular securitizing actors direct speech acts at a specific 
audience. Following this, the speech act’s definition and representation is negotiated and 
reconstituted through social interaction between the actor(s) and the audience (Stritzel, 2007). In 
securitizing previously non-security issues, Austin (1962) states that these speech acts, or 
“performative utterances,” create new patterns of understanding and significance that, over time, 
embed themselves in everyday security practices. The process of securitization is dependent 
upon the capacities of actors to make reputable claims about threats, how these claims are 
conveyed, whether the target audience accepts them, and a multitude of case-specific factors 
(Williams, 2003).  
 The existing context in which speech acts are conveyed from the securitizing actor(s) to the 
target audience is not the primary concern for many constructivists. Constructivists emphasize 
the agency of the particular securitizing agent. Over time, the actions of agents may influence the 
Ebola and Zika responses more than context does. Separate from the logic of securitization 
theory, it is important to note that the WHO’s response may be path-dependent. Path-dependency 
refers to how the WHO’s response to prior outbreaks influences its response to later outbreaks. 
Context refers to the immediate climate in which the pandemic health event is unfolding.  Path-
dependency may take precedence over context as the WHO internalizes past criticism, which 
then influences its future response to pandemic disease threats. In 2009, the WHO was criticized 
for an excessive response to the H1N1 pandemic (Gostin and Hodge Jr., 2016:1906). The 
criticism from 2009 could have influenced the WHO’s caution in issuing a PHEIC for Ebola. 
The WHO was then criticized for not recognizing the seriousness of the 2014 Ebola pandemic 
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sooner (Harmon, 2016). One might argue that the criticism of the WHO’s delayed Ebola 
response could have influenced the WHO’s much faster response to Zika in 2016, despite Zika 
having benign effects for the majority of those infected.  
 Copenhagen theorists rather stress the importance of actors over contexts and path-
dependency. Ingram (2005) says that as the international order welcomed a “new security 
agenda” that recognizes a broader range of security issues, influential actors have reshaped 
orthodox understandings of security where the state was the main referent to the point now that 
individuals and sub-state communities are the referent objects (Paris, 2001:89). Mutually-
reinforcing characters of structures and agents refers to the idea that both structures and agents 
are necessary for the other to exist, meaning that both structure and agent are constantly 
changing through interactions, and respond to change in the other. The Copenhagen School 
asserts that an actor-centric approach more readily describes real-world change; an individual 
actor (usually a political leader), acts as the securitizing actor, conveying speech acts that unleash 
definitional and institutional changes (Williams, 2003). Williams (2003) also notes that the 
importance of individual actors is conditional on the “positional power,” or political influence, of 
an actor that is necessary to successfully securitize an issue. For instance, Elbe (2011) and 
Kamradt-Scott and McInnes (2012) note that medical practitioners, senior policymakers, 
politicians, and journalists as influential actors who have securitized, and continue to securitize, 
pandemic influenza. Such actors contribute to the meaning of security in ways people devoid of 
power or influence cannot (Davies, 2012). Thus, in expanding security beyond past meanings of 
“security,” the meaning of security begins to define larger areas of social life (Waever, 1995).  
  This broadening of security is a result of the redefinition of communicable and non-
communicable diseases as a global health threat by prominent individuals and/or groups that then 
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galvanizes an intended target audience to action (McInnes and Lee, 2006; Kamradt-Scott and 
McInnes, 2012). The example of pandemic influenza illustrates how actors can reframe an 
outbreak as a health pandemic that also threatens political, economic and social stability (Fidler, 
1997; McInnes and Lee, 2006; Labonte and Gagnon, 2010; Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012). 
As a result of pandemic influenza, governments continue to revise and strengthen their pandemic 
readiness protocols, and the World Health Organization created an influenza surveillance 
network to monitor and report outbreaks (Fidler, 1996). Kamradt-Scott and McInnes (2012), 
argue that this network heightens the saliency of influenza such that it requires “surveillance” 
associated with the military and traditional security mechanisms. In addition to WHO action, the 
G7 countries identified global health as a pressing foreign policy issue in the 2007 Oslo 
Declaration, thereby suggesting that countries should devote more security resources to ensure 
the health of their populations (Labonte and Gagnon, 2010). The WHO also launched a Global 
Health Security Initiative in 2014 to bring countries around the world together to form well-
defined commitments to global health, and furthermore to make global health security a 
“national leaders’-level priority” as health was traditional dealt with at a sub-state level (Global 
Health Security Agenda, 2014).  
 Elbe (2011) argues that the WHO constructed SARS, rather than HIV/AIDS, as a security 
threat because of the mortality and potentially catastrophic economic repercussions, while at the 
time HIV/AIDS was understood to kill more slowly. Elbe (2011) further argues that issues of 
high mortality and economic repercussions provide security with a broader medical aspect, as 
any infectious disease causing many deaths and economic damage can now be interpreted as a 
security threat. The National Security Strategy of the United States (The White House, 2006) 
acknowledges that public health pandemics like SARS and HIV/AIDS pose a threat to security 
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as they transcend borders. These two diseases make evident that framing and the mortality rate of 
specific infectious diseases influence the international response to pandemic disease.  
 Others (Rushton, 2011; Weir, 2012; Fourie, 2015; McInnes, 2015; Nunes, 2015) use the 
term, “global health security”, to describe a regime complex linking health and national and 
international security that is led by the World Health Organization to prevent epidemics and 
eradicate disease (Ostergard Jr. and Kauneckis, 2015). For instance, Ingram (2005) notes that the 
UN Security Council addressed HIV/AIDS twice in two separate sessions in 2000 that showed 
global health issues were framed at the highest political level. This high-level discourse similarly 
redefined the relevant security actors to now include doctors and public health experts alongside 
policymakers. Ingram (2005) further argues that the Security Council resolution stated that the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security and recommended 
that national and international efforts to control the pandemic be intensified. Not only did such 
actions highlight the political saliency of global health issues, but also emphasized “the 
interdependency of health risks across nations,” thus suggesting that while inequalities between 
North and South continue to exist, both developing and developed countries fill equally 
important roles in the global health security framework (Labonte and Gagnon, 2010). Fidler 
(1996) notes, in reference to “global health security,” that international cooperation is not what is 
new; what is new is an increasingly interconnected, easily travelled world. As such, countries 
cannot tackle massive public health crises, thereby demonstrating that public health policy 
operates at the international level.  
 In the context of the Ebola and Zika cases, securitization theory suggests that when 
securitizing actors emerge and successfully frame and convey to the WHO and its Member 
States that a pandemic constitutes a security issue, the WHO and its Member States should 
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allocate larger amounts of financial and human resources to address the threat. On the other 
hand, if there are no securitizing actors present to convince the WHO and its Member States that 
a pandemic is a security issue, then the WHO and its Member States will not allocate the same 
level of resources to the response effort. Importantly, an issue does not need to be framed as a 
traditional security issue in order to be securitized, rather a securitizing actor can securitize an 
issue that conveys the urgency with which the issue must be addressed.  
 
Organizational Theory and Principal-Agent Approaches 
 In the final portion of my literature review I turn to the literature concerning the 
relationship between organizational structure, budget, and policy response. Specifically, this 
literature can help us understand how the WHO’s decentralized structure and budgetary 
mechanisms explain the IO’s differing responses to Ebola and Zika. I use organizational theory 
and principal-agent approaches to delegation because both are useful for illustrating the 
relationships between bureaucracies within an organization. In the case of the WHO, principal-
agent theory focuses on the communication, reporting and delegation of tasks between the WHO 
headquarters, regional offices and country-level offices. I specifically use PA theory to explain 
these relationships because PA theory can help us understand how miscommunication can occur 
between the bureaucracies within a large organization. More broadly, PA theory explains the 
relationship between a principal and an agent whereby the principal delegates to an agent a 
specific task that the principal wants the agent to complete often because the agent has 
specialized knowledge in an issue area (Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006:7; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson 
and Tierney, 2006:25). The agent must then carry out this task, however, the agent may shirk its 
duties resulting in an outcome that diverges from the task delegated by the principal (Hawkins, 
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Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006:8 see also Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006:206). Additionally, large 
organizational structure can provide agents with a high degree of autonomy from their principal 
which also increases the risk of agency slack. This section offers a brief survey of the PA 
literature and its application to the WHO. I specifically address the decentralization and budget 
mechanisms of the WHO and how these two independent variables could affect speed of 
response and resources allocated by the WHO and its Member States. 
 The WHO is a decentralized organization consisting of a web of six regional offices and 
150 country offices (WHO, 2017a). The regional offices have evolved to become highly 
autonomous from WHO headquarters in Geneva as the regional office model was based on the 
PAHO that was formed and operated as a regional health office prior to the WHO’s formation in 
1948. Country offices have also developed into autonomous entities and in crisis situations often 
are unable to or choose not to communicate with regional offices to coordinate emergency 
responses (see the example of Guinea during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Rushton, 2011: 780 and 
Gostin and Friedman, 2015:1904).  
 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney (2006:5) highlight the importance of IOs as actors 
that behave strategically. Hawkins and Jacoby (2006:200), similarly conceptualize agents as 
“strategic actors with agency,” as they see IOs as independent actors that also interact with states 
and their wider environment. According to principal-agent theory, principals are actors who cede 
some of their authority to an agent in order for that agent to fulfill a role that the principal 
outlines in the delegation contract (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006:4). Delegation 
contracts are always conditional, and the principal has the authority to revoke the delegation 
contract (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006:7). An agent who is responsible for carrying 
out the tasks outlined in the delegation contract can be individuals, small groups, or 
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organizations (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006:25). Principals and agents participate 
in a delegation relationship in which there is a conditional grant of authority from the principal, 
to the agent to accomplish a particular goal, or mandate (Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006:7). 
Principals delegate to agents to lock in credible commitments, reduce transaction costs, and 
resolve problems in a mutually beneficial way (Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006:205). There are 
varying degrees of delegation that have to do with the composition of the principal (single or 
multiple), the information available to the principal, the specialization of the agent (e.g. the 
World Health Organization’s highly specialized medical and scientific staff), and the willingness 
by the principal to cede some sovereignty to the agent (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 
2006: 12).  
 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney (2006:24) warn that agency slack is a common by-
product of delegation to an agent with specialized knowledge. This phenomenon heightens 
problems of hidden action and hidden information (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006: 
25). As such, they note that the agent can choose to conceal information that the principal may 
want, and such specialization makes it harder for the principal to control its agent. Specialization 
is important to consider in the case of the WHO and its regional offices, as the WHO staff is 
highly specialized and trained at dealing with global health issues. The regional offices are 
occupied by staff who are often specialists in diseases endemic to their region (Patterson, 2016). 
For instance, the PAHO has a wealth of prior experience with mosquito-borne viruses and 
employs many experts in this field. Instances of “shirking”, where an agent deviates from the 
conditions outlined in the delegation contract are also common in PA relationships (Hawkins, 
Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006:8 see also Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006:206). Shirking is difficult 
for the principal to monitor because monitoring is costly in time, effort and money, and agents 
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can hide information from the principal due to their highly specialized knowledge that the 
principal does not have (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006:13). 
 More specifically related to the case of the WHO, Cortell and Peterson (2006:257) note 
that once states grant a significant amount of discretion to an IO, there is a greater chance for IO 
slack to occur, and this is highly probable when an IO is staffed by international personnel, as 
opposed to government officials who are seconded to serve in the IO. Cortell and Peterson 
(2006) show how the WHO staff engaged in agency slack during the 2003 SARS outbreak. They 
suggest that the WHO enjoys a high degree of autonomy from its principal (the Member States 
of the World Health Assembly), due to the two-thirds majority voting rule (that makes agreement 
nearly impossible), and as a result of their international staff (Peterson and Cortell, 2006:263). 
There are a variety of instances in which the highly specialized staff within the WHO push for 
the WHO to extend further into new domains of health and wellness (Peterson and Cortell, 
2006:266). One case of slack occurred when the WHO used non-governmental sources to learn 
more about the 2003 SARS pandemic. This allowed the WHO to then publicly blame the 
Chinese government and criticize their lack of cooperation with the WHO.  
 In addition to expanding its information sources beyond government channels, the WHO 
issued an emergency health alert for various parts of the world where SARS had been reported. 
In this instance, Cortell and Peterson (2006:270) note that the WHO acted beyond its delegation 
contract, and also outside of the International Health Regulations that required reporting from 
national governments rather than non-state sources.  
 Scholars studying IOs and bureaucratic structures argue that organizational bureaucracies 
appear neutral, but are actually highly political, and this is one way in which they derive their 
power and autonomy, resulting in what Barnett and Finnemore (1999:702) call “pathologies” of 
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IOs (also see Ascher, 1983:415; Clift, 2014:viii). An IO’s autonomy is a result of “specialized 
knowledge, training, and experience that is not immediately available to other actors” (Barnett 
and Finnemore, 1999:708). Ascher (1983:415), likewise states that IOs take on a life of their own 
as a result of not only their professional staff, but also their internal structure and organizational 
norms which is often very different from the interest of the delegating Member States. Through 
his study of the World Bank, Ascher (1983:418-429) concluded that resistance to reform was 
because the Bank staff perceived any recommendations as a threat to the professional integrity 
and the traditional economic framework at the World Bank. Nielson and Tierney (2003:264) 
similarly find in their case study on World Bank environmental reform that once the World Bank 
went about hiring more environmental scientists, economists, and engineers, the number of 
environmental projects significantly increased between the 1980s and the early 2000s. IOs, 
Barnett and Finnemore (1999:718) note, “frequently develop distinctive internal cultures that can 
promote dysfunctional behavior” as a by-product of their insulation and highly specialized 
knowledge that allows for organizational subcultures that are distinct from the wider 
environment (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999:719). These cultures form as a result of like-minded 
professionals who create their own distinct worldview, within an insulated organizational 
environment, thus, cementing individual preferences (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999:723). In the 
case of Nielson and Tierney (2003), economists within the World Bank were isolated from actors 
with environmental influence, and only once environmental professionals worked at the Bank 
did loans become more environmentally conscious.  
 The literature on PA theory and organizations is useful in examining how the WHO’s 
decentralized structure could explain the diverging responses to Ebola and Zika. Peabody (1995) 
notes that according to organizational theory the structure of an organization influences its 
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agenda, and, thus, influences outcomes. The decentralized structure of the IO and its highly 
specialized staff allow for greater autonomy of the WHO from its Member States in the World 
Health Assembly and also afford greater autonomy for the regional offices within the WHO. 
Decentralization, due to the number of principal-agent relationships in a delegation chain, slows 
down decision making and leads to slower responses to situations that demand a more immediate 
response. In the case of the WHO, its decentralized organizational structure could lead to 
miscommunications between headquarters, regional and country offices and allow WHO 
bureaucracies to hide hiding information from each other. 
 Additionally, budgeting rules affect the kinds of policy that the WHO enacts. The WHO 
budget is split into two main categories: assessed contributions that are mandatory and voluntary 
contributions that are not. Assessed contributions comprise about 25% of the WHO’s annual 
budget, while voluntary contributions from both Member States and other organizations make up 
the remaining 75% (Biswas, 2014; Clift, 2014:6; Kelland, 2016; Vilhelmsson, 2015). This 
composition poses problems for outbreak and crisis response, and emergency-preparedness. The 
greater the amount of voluntary-specified contributions (that come directly from Member States 
through the WHO, but not from organizations and entities) the more influence wealthy WHO 
Member States have in how regions and individual countries spend their share of the budget. A 
large amount of voluntary-specified contributions is spent on special programs like polio 
eradication that wealthy donor states and corporations feel is in their best interest (Vilhelmsson, 
2015). For instance, of voluntary specified contributions dedicated to the African region 
($373.55 million USD), $92.53 million alone is specifically allocated to Nigeria to fund polio 
eradication programs (WHO, 2016k). There is often a need for spending on special programs, 
however spending on these programs comes at the expense of spending on other categories such 
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as emergency and crisis response. Tying up funds in specific program areas undermines the 
ability of regions and countries to respond to emergency situations as these spending areas are 
not the focus of wealthy donor states and organizations; allocating extra resources for an 
emergency that is not yet happening constitutes a “waste” of Member States’ financial 
contributions (Biswas, 2014; Vilhelmsson, 2015). Instead, these funds are dedicated to programs, 
like polio eradication and spending on endemic diseases, where Member States know their 
financial contributions will make a difference. 
 The bureaucratic structure of the WHO does not vary between the two cases, and thus 
cannot offer predictions on the speed or amount of resources dedicated to the Ebola or Zika 
responses. The PAHO was formed before the WHO, and has historically functioned 
autonomously as an independent health office for the Americas, taking little direction from 
Geneva. The PAHO responded to Zika before the WHO headquarters, however I argue that this 
response was a function of the PAHO’s strong and proactive leadership. AFRO, on the other 
hand, has been criticized for patronage relationships within its organizational hierarchy between 
the Regional Director and the staff in the regional office and country offices in the WHO’s 
African region. In the Ebola case AFRO’s leader ignored communications from headquarters and 
country offices, which could have contributed to a slower initial response to the Ebola outbreak. 
Though decentralization does not vary, leadership emerges from the case studies as a fourth 
independent variable that could affect the speed of response and amount of resources allocated 
by the WHO and its Member States.  
 In the following section I briefly summarize the effect of the WHO’s decentralization and 
budgetary mechanisms, and how these two independent variables relate to the observed 
responses in my two case studies.  
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Decentralized structure and budgetary mechanisms  
Structure: regional offices. The WHO’s decentralized arrangement provides the regions with 
greater autonomy than if headquarters was directly responsible for all regions itself. The longer 
the chain of delegation within and between the offices, the greater the likelihood for bureaucratic 
pathologies and slippage between offices to occur (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 
2006:25). Thus, one expects for the WHO and Member State response to be slower, with fewer 
resources allocated due to the delegation relationships between headquarters and regional offices, 
and also between the regional offices and country offices.  
 
Budgetary mechanisms. The WHO’s budget is split into two main categories: assessed 
contributions and voluntary-specified contributions, with voluntary-specified contributions 
comprising approximately three-quarters of the overall budget each year. The large amount of 
assessed contributions allows individual Member States to decide how the WHO spends the 
funds that the Member States allocate. Voluntary contributions are largely focused on special 
programs that address issues plaguing a region. In the case of AFRO these funds are 
concentrated in polio eradication, vaccine-preventable diseases and HIV/AIDS-related programs. 
There is an emphasis on voluntary spending for special programs because those Member States 
contributing large amounts to these programs are internationally recognized for their efforts, and 
become known for their efforts in polio eradication or malaria prevention. The growth of 
earmarked voluntary funds flowing to special programs, and diminished assessed contributions 
results in fewer available resources when an emergency situation, such as a pandemic outbreak, 
arises. As a result of the WHO’s budgetary mechanisms, one would expect the emergency 
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response to be slower, and consist of fewer resources. 
  
Hypotheses 
 The three literatures produce the following hypotheses, which guide my analysis of the 
WHO and Member States’ response to Ebola and Zika. Hypotheses one and two (H1 and H2) 
relate to the epidemiological literature, hypothesis three (H3) relates to the securitization 
literature, and hypotheses four and five (H4 and H5) guide the organizational structure and 
budget aspect of my case study analysis.  
H1a: The more lethal the disease, the more quickly the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
Member States will respond.  
H1b: The more lethal the disease, the more physical and financial resources the WHO and its 
Member States will allocate to the response.  
H2a: The more easily transmissible the disease, the more quickly the WHO and its Member 
states will respond.  
H2b: The more easily transmissible the disease, the more resources the WHO and its Member 
States will allocate to the response.  
Hypotheses one and two that arise from the epidemiological explanation explain both dependent 
variables: the speed of WHO and Member State response, plus the amount of financial and 
physical resources that are allocated to the response. 
 
Similarly, the securitization literature produces complementary hypotheses that reinforce H1 and 
H2 from the epidemiological explanation:  
H3a: When securitizing actors emerge and frame an outbreak in a persuasive way the outbreak is 
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securitized, and as a result the WHO and its Member States will allocate more physical and 
financial resources to the emergency. 
H3b: When no securitizing actors emerge to frame an outbreak in a persuasive way the outbreak 
will not be securitized, but remain a long-term public health issue. As a result, the WHO and its 
Member States will allocate fewer resources to the public health issue. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b (H3) are related to Hypotheses H1b and H2b, as securitization of a 
pandemic arises due to the greater lethality and transmissibility of the disease. Hypotheses 3a 
and 3b, however, do not offer any prediction about how quickly the pandemic emergency will 
become securitized. In fact, it takes time to securitize a disease outbreak, as securitizing actors 
must reframe the issue and persuade other actors.  The securitization explanation can explain the 
extent to which the WHO and its Member States allocate resources to the emergency. The 
following four hypotheses arise from the organizational structure literature:  
 
H4a: The more decentralized the bureaucratic structures, the slower the WHO and Member 
States’ response to the outbreak.  
H4b: The more centralized the bureaucratic structures, the quicker the WHO and Member 
States’ response to the outbreak.  
 
H5a: The more the budgeting mechanism allows Member States to voluntarily fund public 
health issues on a case by case basis, and the less these contributions are mandatory, the slower 
the response and the fewer resources that the WHO and its Member States will allocate to the 
response.  
H5b: The less the budgeting mechanism allows Member States to voluntarily fund public health 
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issues, and the more contributions are mandatory, the faster the response and the greater the 
amount of resources that the WHO and its Member States will allocate to the response.  
 
The decentralization/centralization hypotheses can explain the speed of response. The budget 
hypotheses can explain both the speed of response and the amount of resources that the WHO 
and its Member States allocate to the response. 
Explanations Hypotheses 
Epidemiological Explanation H1a: The more lethal the disease, the more quickly the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and Member States will 
respond. 
 H1b: The more lethal the disease, the greater the physical 
and financial resources that the WHO and its Member States 
will allocate to its response. 
 H2a: The more easily transmissible the disease, the more 
quickly the WHO and its Member States will respond. 
 H2b: The more easily transmissible the disease, the greater 
the physical and financial resources that the WHO and its 
Member States will allocate to its response. 
Securitization Explanation H3a: When securitizing actors emerge and frame an 
outbreak in a persuasive way the outbreak is securitized, and 
as a result the WHO and its Member States will allocate 
more physical and financial resources to the emergency. 
 H3b: When no securitizing actors emerge to frame an 
outbreak in a persuasive way the outbreak will not be 
securitized, but remain a public health issue. As a result, the 
WHO and its Member States will allocate fewer resources to 
 28 
the public health issue. 
Organization Structure Explanation H4a: The more decentralized the bureaucratic structures, the 
more slowly the WHO and Member States will respond to 
the outbreak. 
 H4b: The more centralized the bureaucratic structures, the 
more quickly the WHO and Member States will response to 
the outbreak. 
 H5a: The more the budgeting mechanism allows Member 
States to voluntarily fund public health issues on a case by 
case basis, and the less these contributions are mandatory, 
the slower the response and the fewer resources that the 
WHO and its Member States will allocate to the response. 
 H5b: The less the budgeting mechanism allows Member 
States to voluntarily fund public health issues, and the more 
contributions are mandatory, the faster the response and the 
greater the amount of resources that the WHO and its 
Member States will allocate to the response. 
 
Methodology 
 In my analysis I use the method of structured, focused comparison to evaluate the WHO 
and its Member States’ responses to Ebola and Zika. To satisfy the “structured” portion of my 
comparison, I apply the same set of questions to both case studies to evaluate Ebola and Zika in 
the same way. George and Bennett (2005:67) state that the method is “focused” as it deals with 
specific aspects of each case in question; a case study cannot contend with all aspects of a given 
phenomenon. In my analysis, I focus exclusively on the WHO and its Member States’ response 
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to Ebola and Zika. The response from the wider international community was also important in 
Ebola, and features prominently in the on-going Zika response. Nevertheless I choose to focus on 
the WHO’s response to the two outbreaks to provide a more satisfying in-depth analysis. In 
addition to structured, focused comparison I use process tracing to identify the steps along the 
way that relate each independent variable to each dependent variable. Process tracing illustrates 
the causal pathways relating the independent variables to the dependent variables in a 
meaningful way. The following section outlines the questions that I use to conduct the structured, 
focused comparison and process tracing in my two case studies.  
 
Questions Guiding My Structured Focused Comparison and Process Tracing  
 The method of structured, focused comparison requires a set of questions that are asked of 
each case study to assess cases in the same way. I formulated my questions based on the three 
explanations I developed above. I begin first by establishing the dependent variable: 
What was the nature of the WHO and Member States’ response to the disease outbreak? What 
kinds of resources were expended, and by whom? 
 
The epidemiological response produces the following questions: 
1. How lethal is the virus? 
2. How transmissible is the virus?  
3. What kind of long-term implications does the virus have for affected societies, countries, 
or regions? What are its long term effects?  
 
The following questions arise from the securitization explanation:  
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4. Who were the security actors who were active in framing each case? 
5. Was the case framed as a rapidly evolving emergency, or framed as a public health issue 
requiring sustained engagement?  
6. What security frames were circulating at the time?  What was the dominant discourse 
around each disease?  Were there any competing frames put forth by other actors that did 
not become the dominant frames through which the outbreaks were described and 
directed at the audience?  
7. What was the intended audience for these frames?  Was the audience convinced/not 
convinced by the securitizing actors’ framing?  
8. How did the media portray the frames put forth by the securitizing actors? Did the media 
attempt to alter the frames in any way? 
9. To what extent did financial and human resources flow to the affected regions following 
the framing of the outbreak by securitizing actors?  
 
The last questions are products of the organizational structure and budget explanation:  
10. What bureaucracies were involved in responding to each case? 
11. How centralized were these bureaucracies? 
12. Had these bureaucracies experienced similar outbreaks in the past?  
13. Did the bureaucracies involved have existing emergency response coordination 
mechanisms?  
14. What budgetary mechanisms (specifically Assessed Contributions, and Voluntary- 
Member State Specified Contributions) do these bureaucracies use to fund their 
emergency response efforts? 
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15. What mechanisms existed for allocating budget resources to disease outbreaks? 
 
Strengths and weaknesses of structured, focused comparison and process tracing 
 Structured, focused comparison allows for a systematic comparison between two case 
studies as each case study is evaluated using the same list of questions. Moreover, the questions 
used in a structured, focused comparison allow for an in-depth evaluation of each case study 
making structured, focused comparison a technique amenable to process tracing. Individual case 
studies, while making important knowledge contributions, arguably lack a “basis for systematic 
comparison” (George and Bennett, 2005:68). Case studies should use variables that allow for 
explanation across cases and provide policymakers with information that acts as leverage with 
which they can influence other outcomes beyond the selected case(s) used for analysis. 
Evaluating two (or more) cases using the method of structured, focused comparison avoids the 
trap of single case studies that have difficulties in contributing to a larger theory about the 
phenomenon that the case is an instance of (George and Bennett, 2005:70). Structured, focused 
comparison directs research using specific questions about a particular aspect of historical cases, 
hence contributing to theory development. 
 While my analysis may not result in a theory that weaves together epidemiological, 
securitization and bureaucratic approaches to understand the World Health Organization’s 
response to pandemic outbreaks, my selected methods prevent me from falling into the trap of 
relying on a single theory or approach for explaining each case. As a result, my analysis explains 
more than a single theory could on its own, and thus leads to a better understanding of the factors 
that contribute to the WHO and Member States’ response in my two case studies (George and 
Bennett, 2005:68).   
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 The strengths and weaknesses of process tracing go hand-in-hand with those of structured, 
focused comparison. Process tracing pays “close attention to sequences of independent, 
dependent and intervening variables” (Collier, 2011:823). This methodology can shed light on 
potential causal mechanisms (Collier, 2011:824). Process tracing does have weaknesses, 
however, such as problems of missing variables and determining the extent of a causal 
relationship between independent and dependent variables (Collier, 2011:828). In general, with 
case study analysis, it is difficult to extrapolate the causal process delineated by process tracing 
in one or two cases to a wider variety of cases.  
 A structured, focused comparison with a focus on the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and Member States response is useful for understanding the speed of response and the resources 
allocated to the response in each case. The method of structured, focused comparison allows for 
a more complete explanation that considers various independent variables that result in variances 
in the dependent variables, the speed of response and the amount of resources allocated to the 
response in each case. To begin, there is more information on the WHO and its Member States’ 
response than on individual countries’ responses to the outbreak. In evaluating the WHO 
response, I take into account responses led by WHO Member States when this information 
becomes relevant for explaining the WHO response as a whole.  
             Additional literature analyzes and critiques the WHO’s response, likely because it serves 
as the world’s coordinating health agency. Incorporating critiques from other scholars into my 
analysis of the WHO’s response to Ebola and Zika allows for a multi-faceted analysis that 
considers various aspects of my two cases that I would not have otherwise considered. Situating 
research within the existing literature demonstrates how my research contributes to the existing 
scholarship and help predict WHO response to future outbreaks (George and Bennett, 2005:71). 
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By situating my research within the existing literature, I hope to demonstrate how my thesis fills 
gaps in existing knowledge and contributes to theory that helps predict the WHO and Member 
States responses to future outbreaks. 
 I chose Ebola and Zika as case studies because the cases produce an interesting empirical 
puzzle that warrants further analysis. Ebola is a much more lethal disease than Zika, however the 
WHO and its Member States took eight months to recognize the extent of the emergency in West 
Africa. Ebola, however, is much less transmissible than Zika. Once securitizing actors framed 
Ebola as a threat to national and international security did the WHO declare a PHEIC, and its 
Member States come to understand Ebola as a security threat. The PHEIC announcement is not 
the securitizing act; securitization of Ebola was a process occurring prior to the PHEIC 
announcement. The framing of Ebola as a security issue by heads of government and leaders 
within other organizations prompted the WHO’s Member States to contribute large amounts of 
resources to the response efforts. The extent of the response included large amounts of financial 
aid to set up clinics and send doctors to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The response also 
included a military response from the United States, Canada, China, the United Kingdom and 
Germany (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2015). In addition to this, Ebola 
occurred in a region with a dysfunctional WHO regional office, the African Regional Health 
Office (AFRO). The decentralized nature of the WHO, and bureaucratic pathologies within this 
particular regional office arguably prevented a quicker response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak. The 
African Regional Health Office does have quite a large budget dedicated to emergency and crisis 
response, however the observed response to Ebola initially is delayed. There must be another 
explanation for AFRO’s initially slow response, and I predict that the slow response is 
attributable to the decentralized nature of the WHO system and the structure of the WHO’s 
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budget.  
 
Independent and Dependent Variables 
  The epidemiological explanation has two independent variables: the lethality and 
transmissibility of each virus. The lethality of the virus is measured through the case fatality rate, 
while the transmissibility of a virus is measured through the reproductive number, R0. The 
securitization explanation likewise has two independent variables: the security actors and the 
security frames set by key securitizing actors. Securitizing actors are high-profile political 
leaders, academics, and leaders of international and regional organizations who frame an issue as 
a threat to national/regional/international security. Security frames will elevate a phenomenon 
from “politics as normal” to something that represents an existential threat requiring greater 
resources.  
 Lastly, the organizational structure explanation has two independent variables: 
decentralization of WHO bureaucracy and the budgetary mechanisms (specifically the split of 
the annual budget between assessed and voluntary-specified contributions).  For 
centralization/de-centralization I looked at the overall structure of the WHO, and the 
organization of the regional offices (AFRO and the PAHO). I looked at the WHO budget for 
2014-2015 in the Ebola case, and the WHO 2016-2017 budget for the Zika case. I specifically 
separated my analysis into assessed (i.e. mandatory) contributions by Member States and 
voluntary-specified contributions. From here, in each budgetary year I examine the percentage of 
the overall WHO budget, and budgets for the respective regional offices that was allocated to the 
categories of “outbreak and crisis response”, “emergency risk and crisis management”, “alert and 
response capacity”, and “epidemic- and pandemic-prone diseases” to determine whether the 
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regional offices allocated spending to epidemic/pandemic-prone viruses like Ebola and Zika. 
These sub-categories are grouped within a larger category in the WHO budget titled 
Preparedness, Surveillance, and Response. Beyond the budgets for the regional offices and WHO 
headquarters, I look at the funds flowing into the worst affected countries in each case, and how 
the country offices spent both assessed and voluntary contributions in the relevant budgetary 
year. I also provide additional insight with excerpts from an interview with a WHO official who 
worked on funding for the Ebola response.  
 There are two dependent variables in my analysis that I think are causally related, or at the 
very least correlated with the independent variables. The dependent variables are the speed of 
response by both the WHO and its Member States, and the extent to which resources are 
allocated by the WHO and its Member States. The speed of response is measured in the 
following way: the starting date at which the outbreak is reported; and the amount of time 
between the start of the outbreak and the declaration of the PHEIC. Finally, the time between the 
declaration of the PHEIC and the flow of financial and human resources to the affected areas is 
used to measure the speed of response. The extent to which resources are allocated by the WHO 
and its Member States is measured by examining the financial resources contributed to the 
Preparedness, Surveillance, and Response category within the WHO’s budget at both the 
regional and country office levels.  
Explanation Independent Variable 
Epidemiological Explanation Lethality 
 Transmissibility 
Securitization Explanation Presence of securitizing actors 
 Security frames deployed by securitizing actors 
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Bureaucratic 
Structure/Budget 
Explanation 
Centralization/Decentralization 
 Budgetary Mechanisms (assessed contributions vs 
voluntary-specified contributions) 
 
Data Description 
 The data for my analysis comes from an array of sources. The data for the epidemiological 
explanation primarily comes from the Centers for Disease Control and World Health 
Organization websites. Both organizations provide basic scientific facts about Ebola and Zika, 
such as their lethality, transmissibility and modes of transmission. The securitization explanation 
requires large amounts of data from a variety of sources. I consulted a wide variety of journal 
articles, news reports, and official reports from organizations to identify the securitizing actors, 
and the frames that the securitizing actors construct. I used similar data sources to identify the 
size of response, that includes both financial and human resources dedicated to the emergency 
response in each case study. The financial response is measured in terms of the dollar amount 
allocated to the response, while the human resources aspect is measured in terms of the number 
of relevant personnel involved on the ground in the affected regions. I consulted the World 
Health Organization’s budget website to gain information on the size of the budget, and the way 
in which the budget is allocated for the 2014-2015 period and 2016-2017 period. These two 
budgetary periods align as closely as possible with my two case studies. I specifically focus on 
two budgetary mechanisms: Assessed Contributions and Voluntary- Member State Specified 
Contributions. These two budgetary mechanisms make up the majority of the WHO’s budget, 
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with the amount of voluntary contributions far surpassing the amount of assessed contributions. I 
think that this distinction between assessed and voluntary contributions is important in 
understanding the WHO and Member States’ responses in each case. The centralization and 
decentralization of the WHO is the second and final aspect of the WHO’s organizational 
structure that I evaluate. Centralization and decentralization are measured by examining 
coordination mechanisms in place in the event of a major health crisis. I mainly use news reports 
and academic journal articles to determine the number of relevant personnel involved on the 
ground, and the type of personnel involved in the emergency response in each case.  
 
 
Case Studies 
In the following section I use the epidemiological, securitization and bureaucratic 
structure and budget explanations to assess each case. I proceed chronologically with my 
analysis: first I examine the 2014 Ebola case and then I assess the 2016 Zika case.  
 
2014 Ebola Pandemic in West Africa 
 
Establishing the dependent variables: speed of response and amount of resources procured 
 Ebola virus is an infectious illness that can have a 90 percent fatality rate and is spread 
through bodily fluids. The 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak had a 60 percent fatality rate, which is 
comparable to previous outbreaks in Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo (CDC, 2014a). 
The Ebola outbreak began in Meliandou, a Guinean village, in December 2013. Cholera, a 
 38 
disease endemic to the region, has similar symptoms—including severe stomach pain, diarrhea, 
and vomiting—which led to initial reports of a cholera outbreak (CDC, 2014c; CDC, 2016f).   
 Later in March Liberia reported its first cases of Ebola (Sifferlin, 2014). At this time 
there were suspected but no confirmed cases in Sierra Leone. Guinea’s Ministry of Health issued 
the first alert of an “unidentified disease” and the WHO published this notice on its website on 
March 23 (WHO, 2017c). Later that same day the African Regional Health Office (AFRO) 
opened its Emergency Management System to address the emerging outbreak, however it 
mistakenly labeled the outbreak as Lassa fever. Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) was called into 
Guinea to investigate the outbreak alongside the Ministry of Health and AFRO from March 14th 
to 25th. Mid-way through the investigation, Institut Pasteur also joined the investigation 
activities. Near the end of this extensive investigation, the WHO confirmed on March 23, 2014, 
after receiving reports from Guinea, that the outbreak was Ebola virus disease (EVD), and 
confirmed twenty-nine Ebola-related deaths (WHO, 2015a). 
 As of August 6, 2014 there were 961 confirmed, probable, and suspected cases across the 
three worst-affected countries, including Nigeria that had two probable Ebola deaths (WHO, 
2016l). The Emergency Committee for Ebola, convened under the International Health 
Regulations (IHR 2005), concluded that the “Ebola outbreak in West Africa constitute[d] an 
‘extraordinary event’ and a public health risk to other States”, and that further spread is 
particularly serious due to the high case fatality rate of Ebola virus (WHO, 2015b:12). 
Subsequently, the Committee called for a coordinated international response to prevent the 
international spread of the virus (WHO, 2014b). On August 8, 2014, WHO Director-General Dr. 
Margaret Chan declared Ebola a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). 
Shortly after Dr. Chan declared the PHEIC, the number of confirmed cases and deaths across 
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Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone began to grow at an alarming rate. Throughout August and 
September 2014 world leaders spoke out against the dangers of the Ebola epidemic and the need 
for a quick response on the ground in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. The United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly and Security Council were also instrumental in pushing for international 
support as they each passed resolutions (69/1 and 2177 respectively) characterizing Ebola as a 
threat to international peace and security.  
Though the majority of financial resources arrived to the three worst affected countries 
following Dr. Chan’s PHEIC declaration, there were regional organizations, such as the African 
Development Bank Group, that allocated resources to the outbreak before the WHO declared a 
PHEIC. Countries such as Australia, Brunei, Canada, Croatia, Germany, Japan, India, Italy, 
Luxembourg, South Korea, Slovakia, and the United States also allocated small financial sums to 
the Ebola outbreak before the WHO declared Ebola a PHEIC, however the dollar amounts for 
most donations were each less than one million USD, with the exception of Denmark ($3.4 
million USD), Norway ($2.7 million USD), and Kuwait ($5 million USD) (WHO, 2016a). The 
only agency within the United Nations to send funds to West Africa before the PHEIC on August 
8, 2014 was the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which sent an initial $500,000 USD 
on May 25, 2014 followed by an additional $103,000 on June 16 and $311,000 on July 1, 2014. 
The CERF relies on donations mainly from Member State governments, as well as foundations, 
companies, charities and individuals, compiling donations into a fund that in theory is ready for 
“immediate use at the onset of emergencies” (UNCERF, 2017). The CERF, despite its promise 
to use its funds at the “immediate onset of emergencies” took five months to dedicate funds to 
the Ebola response in West Africa that amounted to less than $1 million USD. 
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 On September 19, 2014, a day after the General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions, the United Nations Secretary General, Ban ki-Moon in cooperation with the WHO, 
established the United Nations Mission for Emergency Ebola Response (UNMEER) to 
coordinate national health systems, international organizations and Member States efforts in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea (WHO, 2014c:1). Financial resources began to flood into the 
three most severely affected countries while military resources followed in September, October, 
and November 2014. Military deployments led to a surge in the response on the ground in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2015). 
The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, China, France, and Japan contributed military 
doctors, supplies, and transportation to assist with relief efforts in West Africa (London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2015). Additionally, Cuba, Britain, France, China, and Brazil 
sent healthcare workers to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea (Mark, 2014).  
 By the end of the outbreak in March 2016, Ebola had claimed 11,310 lives, and resulted 
in 28,616 total cases (CDC, 2016b). The WHO officially terminated the PHEIC on March 29, 
2016 once Liberia was declared Ebola-free after experiencing no new cases for forty-two days 
(CDC, 2016b).  
 Eight months passed from the time of the outbreak to the point when Dr. Margaret Chan 
declared Ebola a PHEIC. Once Dr. Chan declared Ebola a global health emergency, the response 
from the WHO and its Member States followed with WHO Member States pledging significant 
additional voluntary contributions and bilateral donations outside of the WHO. Below, I test the 
three approaches as explanations for why the response came so late, but received a lot of 
resources.   
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Epidemiological explanation for the Ebola response. I predict that the more lethal and the more 
transmissible the disease, the more quickly WHO and its Member States will respond and the 
more physical and financial resources they will allocate to the response. In the following section 
I examine Ebola’s lethality and transmissibility to predict WHO Member States’ speed of 
response and level of resources allocated. I compare my predictions with evidence of response 
time and resources allocated to the crisis to determine whether lethality, transmissibility, or both 
impact my two dependent variables.  
 Case fatality measures the lethality of a particular infectious disease. During the 2014 
Ebola outbreak the case fatality rate was sixty percent, with some sources reporting a case 
fatality rate as high as seventy percent (CDC, 2014a). This was the largest Ebola outbreak ever 
with 11,315 confirmed deaths worldwide, and 28,637 reported confirmed cases.  
 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) define transmissibility as the 
“estimations of the basic reproductive number, R0” (CDC, 2014b). For instance, if R0 were 5, 
this would imply that for every one person infected with the virus, five additional people also 
would become infected. During the 2014 Ebola outbreak, the R0 was similar to the R0 in 
previous Ebola outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda (CDC, 2015). R0 
was estimated to range between 1.5 and 2.2, depending on the area where R0 was initially 
measured (Althaus, 2014). While Ebola is contagious without the proper personal protective 
equipment, an R0 between one and two is not very contagious, seeing as Ebola can only be 
spread through bodily fluids (CDC, 2015). Ebola transmission is minimized through proper 
sanitation and use of personal protective equipment such as surgical masks, protective suits, and 
latex gloves (CDC, 2015). The Centers for Disease Control cite improper use and lack of 
personal protective equipment as a main contributor to the rapid spread of Ebola (CDC, 2015). 
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For comparison purposes, the R0 of highly transmissible viruses, such as measles, is 18 (CDC, 
2015). 
 In addition to Ebola being a highly lethal, but not very transmissible virus, it has serious 
long-term health consequences for survivors. These long-term consequences affect not only 
population health, but also national economies. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have each 
experienced civil wars in the last two decades that devastated their ability to provide public 
services and develop productive economies. The health of Ebola survivors is a major concern as 
these countries seek to reconstruct following the largest Ebola outbreak in history. Ebola 
survivors contend with eye problems such as blurred or cloudy vision, or a burning sensation 
behind the eye (Yasmin, 2016). In addition to vision impairments, Liberian epidemiologist 
Mosoka Fallah reported that two third of his patients had severe neurological difficulties 
(Yasmin, 2016). Survivors frequently suffer from memory loss and chronic joint and muscle 
pain. This array of symptoms is referred to as post-Ebola syndrome. 
 The pandemic has caused economic disruption in countries that were already fragile. The 
World Bank estimated the total economic impact of Ebola at $2.8 billion (World Bank, 2016). 
The worst losses occurred in Sierra Leone ($1.9 billion), followed by Guinea ($600 million) and 
Liberia ($300 million) (World Bank, 2016). Economic decline led to a decrease in investor 
confidence, which in turn negatively impacted investment and private sector growth (World 
Bank, 2016). The significant contraction in GDP during the outbreak has resulted in even slower 
post-pandemic recovery (Mullan, 2015). Relatively large foreign aid inflows have helped 
cushion Ebola-related shocks to West African economies (World Bank, 2016). 
 Given the evidence on Ebola’s high lethality but low transmissibility, the epidemiological 
explanation produces an inconclusive prediction. Ebola is not a highly transmissible disease with 
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an R0 between 1 and 2, and thus, the response by WHO and its Member States should be slow 
and not receive many resources. Ebola, however, is a highly lethal disease with this particular 
outbreak having a 60 percent case fatality rate (CDC 2014a). The theory would suggest that the 
WHO and Member State response would be quick and receive many resources. Lethality appears 
to be correlated with increased expenditures but does not correlate with the speed of WHO and 
Member State response to the Ebola outbreak as the WHO and its Member States responded 
eight months after initial Ebola transmission in Guinea.  
 Both lethality and transmissibility likely matter for whether or not a securitizing actor 
frames an infectious disease outbreak as a security issue. It is the presence of securitizing actors, 
however, that ultimately determines the likelihood that an issue is securitized rather than the 
particular characteristics of a virus. I now move to the securitization explanation to investigate 
how speech acts, leading up to Director-General Margaret Chan’s PHEIC declaration, and 
reinforcement of security frames following the PHEIC declaration affect the amount of resources 
that the WHO and its Member States allocated to the Ebola response. To understand factors that 
drive the speed of WHO and Member State response, it is helpful to examine political processes 
such as securitization and an organization’s structure and budget. In the next section I turn to the 
first of these political processes, securitization, to explain the politics of securitization in the 
context of the 2014 Ebola outbreak.  
 
Securitization explanation for the Ebola response. Securitization theory predicts that when 
securitizing actors emerge and frame an outbreak in a persuasive way, the outbreak becomes 
securitized, and as a result the WHO and its Member States will allocate more physical and 
financial resources to the emergency (H3a). In the absence of securitizing actors, the outbreak 
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will not be framed as a security issue but will remain a less threatening public health issue that 
will lead the WHO and its Member States to allocate fewer resources to the response (H3b). In 
the following section I examine the key actors responsible for securitizing Ebola. Once Ebola is 
securitized, if securitization theory is correct, we should see a surge in the WHO and its Member 
States’ allocation of physical and financial resources to combat the Ebola virus in West Africa.   
 Other states in the region such as Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
experienced Ebola outbreaks, however the 2014 outbreak was the first time in the history of the 
region that an Ebola outbreak spread across national borders and occurred in Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone (CDC, 2016h). The spread across national borders presented new challenges 
for containment and coordination across the three-worst affected countries. Arguably, the extent 
to which the Ebola virus spread throughout West Africa represented a more threatening issue that 
required measures extending beyond traditional public health protocols. Prior to WHO Director-
General Margaret Chan declaring the PHEIC on August 8, 2014 prominent actors within the 
governments of Member States, international humanitarian organizations, and the media 
employed language that successfully framed Ebola as a security issue. The WHO and its 
Member States used the circulating security language in order to justify the PHEIC and 
subsequent increase in financial and physical resources to the Ebola response in West Africa. I 
then turn to other prominent actors who reinforced the framing of Ebola as a security threat 
through speeches, and symbolic actions. Concluding the securitization explanation, I synthesize 
the evidence and draw conclusions based on the securitization framework. 
 The initial securitizing move came from the United States when Laura Holgate, the senior 
director for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism and Threat Reduction at the National 
Security Council, announced the U.S. launch of the Global Health Security Agenda on February 
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16, 2014 amidst the growing Ebola outbreak in West Africa (USAID, 2016). In the 
announcement, Holgate explained that the Global Health Security Agenda was necessary to 
“strengthen the ability of the international community to prevent, detect, and respond to 
infectious disease outbreaks, such as Ebola” (U.S. Official News, 2014). On April 1 2014, 
humanitarian organization, Médecins Sans Frontiers that the Ebola outbreak could be an 
“unprecedented” epidemic, at the same time as the WHO downplayed the extent of the Ebola 
virus citing that there had only been 80 deaths so far (World Digest, 2014). Throughout the 
summer of 2014 the Ebola outbreak exploded, and it was not until early August, before the 
PHEIC declaration, that more actors began speaking of Ebola as a serious security threat. On 
August 6, the Lagos State governor, Babatunde Fashola explicitly stated that Ebola was a 
“national security issue” that required more attention from the international community (BBC 
Monitoring Africa, 2014). That same day Senegalese President Macky Sall echoed Fashola’s 
statement: “Ebola is not an African disease. It is necessary to confront Ebola as a threat to 
humanity” (Landler, 2014). On August 8, 2014 Vice-President Ken Isaacs of Samaritan’s Purse, 
which is a Christian international relief organization, stated that “the outbreak has the potential to 
be a national security risk” (Associated Press, 2014). Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
argued that the worst recorded Ebola outbreak in history “requires extraordinary measures for the 
very survival of our state and for the protection of the lives of our people” (Associated Press, 
2014). Talking about the Ebola outbreak as “a threat to humanity”, “a national security risk”, and 
an outbreak that requires “extraordinary measures” to ensure state survival successfully framed 
Ebola as an existential threat to international peace and security.  
 Prior to the PHEIC declaration, the first Emergency Committee meeting convened on 
August 6, 2014 and concluded that the “Ebola outbreak in West Africa constitutes an 
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‘extraordinary event’ and a public health risk to other States” and that further spread would be 
particularly serious due to the high case fatality rate of the virus (WHO, 2015b:12). Following 
the PHEIC declaration, funds from international organizations like the World Bank, and private 
foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation also dramatically increased their 
donations to the Ebola outbreak following the PHEIC announcement. For instance, prior to the 
PHEIC, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation donated $1.1 million USD on July 1, 2014. 
However, following the PHEIC declaration, the Foundation made four subsequent donations in 
August, September, October and November 2014 that totaled more than $12 million USD 
(WHO, 2014b). Though other international organizations like the Gates Foundation and World 
Bank are not the subject of my analysis, it is important to note the scaling up of these 
contributions alongside contributions arriving at the WHO from Member States.    
The declaration of the PHEIC is symbolic as the WHO only declared two previous 
PHEICs for swine flu in 2009 and polio in 2014. A PHEIC can be interpreted as a symbol that 
the WHO has recognized the threat to stability and security in West Africa given that PHEICs 
are only declared in extreme circumstances. Following the declaration of the PHEIC on August 
8, 2014, large amounts of resources began to flow into the three worst-affected West African 
countries from the WHO and its Member States, but also from other UN bodies (like the UN 
Development Programme and Multi-Donor Trust Fund), and international organizations.  
 Other actors subsequently reinforced the initial securitization of Ebola. These actors 
include political leaders within WHO Member States who explicitly framed Ebola as an 
international security threat through speeches and, implicitly, through symbolic acts. The media 
reinforced these frames, and in doing so directed public attention to the Ebola outbreak. Media 
reporting on the outbreak did not attempt to alter the frames put forth by government officials 
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and international organizations, but instead the media helped disseminate these frames to the rest 
of the world. According to Yusuf et al. (2015:1), the media coverage was “prolific and 
unbalanced,” as the media reported heavily on the few isolated Ebola cases in the United State. 
They argue that this over-coverage of American Ebola cases intensified fears and led to the 
spread of misinformation via social media, however did not constitute securitizing language 
(Yusuf et al., 2015:1).  
Other securitizing actors who were not within the WHO or its Member States are 
important to mention briefly in the discussion of Ebola as a security issue. In an article for 
Foreign Policy published on October 8, 2015, prominent global health writer Laurie Garrett 
describes the 2014 Ebola crisis as a “9/11 moment of the global health leadership” and in 
particular for the WHO (Garrett, 2015). Garrett pushes for a review similar to the one that the 
9/11 Commission conducted on terrorism and al-Qaeda following the September 11 terrorist 
attacks (Garrett, 2015). Garret likens Ebola to terrorism, a significant security threat to the 
United States, and in doing so implies that Ebola is a national security threat that is on the same 
level as terrorism. Charitable organizations also played a role in securitizing the Ebola pandemic 
in West Africa. Médecins Sans Frontiers, in an uncharacteristic move, called for military 
assistance as MSF has always strongly opposed military intervention during previous pandemic 
outbreaks (Garrett, 2014). MSF’s request for military assistance further reinforces that Ebola 
constituted a threat to international security as MSF’s call for help departed from the 
organization’s rejection of military intervention during previous pandemics.  
 World leaders followed suit.  French President François Hollande spoke about the 
outbreak on August 28, 2014 as a threat to international security: “In West Africa, a major public 
health threat is added to the specter of terrorism, overwhelming countries that up to now had 
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been regarded as some of the world’s most dynamic economically…We are not doing this 
simply out of generosity; we are doing it because we are aware that this misery and this poverty 
create a breeding ground for terrorism” (Holland, 2014). President Hollande framed Ebola as a 
phenomenon that could create the conditions for terrorism, thus suggesting that Ebola is not just 
a public health problem, but a transnational security issue that no one country could cope with on 
its own. 
 President Obama reinforced Hollande’s framing of Ebola on September 16, 2014 when 
he delivered a speech at CDC headquarters in Atlanta, when he allocated 3,000 U.S. personnel 
and $750 million USD to the relief efforts in Liberia. Accompanying this huge increase in U.S. 
military commitment to the cause, Obama explicitly framed the epidemic as a grave security 
threat to the region, and possibly to the whole world. He said, “In West Africa, Ebola is now an 
epidemic of the likes that we have not seen before. It’s spiraling out of control. It is getting 
worse… And if the outbreak is not stopped now, we could be looking at hundreds of thousands 
of people infected, with profound political, and economic, and security implications for all of us. 
So this is an epidemic that is not just a threat to regional security— it’s a potential threat to 
global security…” (Garrett, 2014). President Obama explicitly framed Ebola as a security issue 
in a speech at the CDC and reinforced this frame when he ordered a deployment of U.S. troops to 
Liberia. The United States established Operation United Assistance in September 2014 and 
partnered with USAID to build Ebola Treatment Units with larger patient capacity (Pellerin, 
2014). Obama later spoke about Ebola as a “growing threat to global security” at the United 
Nations in September 2014 (Haglage, 2014). Obama’s securitizing rhetoric cannot explain the 
increased resource allocation, seeing as it did not precede the increased resource allocation. 
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Obama’s rhetoric, however, is consistent with the increased resource allocation that is observed 
throughout September, October and November 2014.  
 Shortly after Obama’s speeches at the CDC and UN, United Nations Secretary General 
Ban ki-Moon circulated identical letters to the Security Council and General Assembly that 
stated that “the situation had gone beyond being a crisis only of public health” and threatened 
international security (United Nations Security Council, 2014). Following the Secretary 
General’s warning, the United States, which held the presidency of the Security Council, called 
for an emergency meeting to discuss Ebola.  At this meeting on September 18, 2014 all fifteen 
members unanimously passed Resolution 2177, with 130 countries in the General Assembly co-
sponsoring it. Resolution 2177, combined with overwhelming support from non-Security 
Council members signals that Member States are willing to put aside the usual politics within the 
Security Council to address an imminent threat. 
 Resolution 2177 specifically noted the threat to post-conflict stability, deterioration of the 
political and security situation in a fragile region, and impact on food security (WHO, 2014c). 
The United Nations Security Council members used language explicitly framing Ebola as a 
security threat by stressing the fragility of the affected West African nations and potential for 
state failure. The resolution in the closing remarks stated the following: 
It is clear that Ebola is no longer just a public health crisis, but has become multidimensional, 
with significant political, social, economic, humanitarian, logistical and security dimensions. 
No one country, no one organization has the resources to stem the tide of the Ebola crisis. 
Each Government is ultimately responsible for its own people. The governments of West 
Africa have asked for our help. We must come together as one United Nations and we call 
upon Member States to join us (WHO, 2014c). 
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 The Security Council’s further reinforcement of Ebola as a security threat is also 
symbolic: this was only the second time that the Security Council addressed a public health 
emergency. The Security Council first addressed HIV/AIDS when it began to spread at an 
alarming rate in the early 2000s (Associated Press at the United Nations, 2014). In addition to the 
Security Council resolution, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 69/1, one 
day after, on September 19, 2014. The language contained in the Resolution 69/1, mimicked that 
of the Security Council resolution, and reinforced the framing of Ebola as a security threat. 
General Assembly Resolution 69/1 furthermore expressed “deep concern about the potential 
reversal of the gains made by the affected countries in peace building, political stability, and the 
reconstruction of socioeconomic infrastructure in recent years.” The states urged the 
international community to take action to contain the crisis because of its “possible grave 
humanitarian, economic and social consequences” (WHO, 2014c). 
 UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon, in cooperation with the WHO formed United 
Nations Mission for Ebola Response (UNMEER) one day after the Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions (WHO, 2014c:1). UNMEER’s establishment serves as a symbol: it was 
created because Ebola had progressed beyond the capabilities of existing WHO coordination and 
response mechanisms, thus reinforcing the gravity of the threat (WHO, 2014c:3). UNMEER’s 
founding documents describe that the mission was established because it “was clear that the 
Ebola outbreak was unprecedented and had outstripped the capacity of governments and 
international responders to contain using traditional outbreak approaches” (WHO, 2014c:3).  
 In addition to the surge in financial resources flowing to West Africa following the 
PHEIC declaration, military assistance arrived shortly after the Security Council and General 
Assembly passed Resolution 2177 and 69/1 respectively (Garrett, 2014). Operation United 
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Assistance began its mission in early October 2014 and peaked by December 2014 when 3,000 
U.S. military personnel arrived in Liberia to construct Ebola treatment units (Haglage, 2014). On 
the heels of the U.S. deployments, in mid-October 2014, the United Kingdom deployed an extra 
600 military personnel to Sierra Leone to back up the 150 personnel who were already helping 
with relief efforts in Sierra Leone (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2015). 
The initial 150 personnel deployed to the region in the first week of October 2014 following the 
various speeches from Presidents Obama and Hollande and Prime Minister David Cameron 
(London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2015). Alongside the U.S. and British 
militaries, Germany and China deployed troops in September while France and Canada deployed 
their militaries in November and December respectively (Grunau, 2014; Aljazeera, 2015; 
Canadian Armed Forces, 2014). In total, the six countries deployed approximately 5,000 troops 
to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. Médecins Sans Frontiers and the International Red Cross 
operated alongside foreign military personnel across the three worst-affected states (London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2015). 
 The securitization approach highlights the fact that security language was used to justify 
the PHEIC and subsequent surge in financial and physical resources dedicated to the response. 
The process involved numerous actors who began speaking about Ebola as a growing threat that 
required urgent attention.  World leaders, the media, and international and humanitarian 
organizations further reinforced the framing of Ebola as a security issue through explicit action 
and implicit gestures. Securitization theory demonstrates how securitizing actors altered the way 
that Ebola was framed, from a health issue to a security issue, and predicts that the Ebola 
response therefore would receive more resources. Evidence suggests that there were key 
securitizing actors within Member States, the WHO, and other international organizations that 
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fully securitized Ebola before the WHO declared the PHEIC. While the securitization approach 
can explain the amount of resources that the WHO and Member States allocated to the outbreak, 
securitization theory suggests a relatively slow response. Since securitization is a lengthy 
process, rather than a single event, one expects a slow response time.  The audience, in this case 
the WHO Member States and international and humanitarian organizations, must first become 
convinced that Ebola is a threat to security. They then require additional time to coordinate the 
response. While the securitization explanation cannot provide causal evidence that securitizing 
Ebola either increases or decreases the speed of response, the logic of securitization theory 
would suggest that as securitization is a slow process, securitizing Ebola produces a slower 
response by the WHO and its Member States. 
 In the last section I turn to the decentralization and budgetary mechanisms at the WHO 
and AFRO in order to complete my analysis of the speed of response and resources allocated to 
the Ebola response.  
 
Organizational structure and budget explanation. I predict that the more decentralized the 
bureaucratic structures (H4a), and the fewer available assessed contributions dedicated to 
emergency response categories in the WHO’s budget (H5a), the slower the response from the 
WHO and its Member States. Conversely, the more centralized the bureaucratic structures and 
the greater the available assessed contributions allocated to emergency response categories, the 
faster the WHO and its Member States’ response. In the following section I first address the 
WHO’s decentralized bureaucratic structure and how— as a result of miscommunications and 
misunderstandings between headquarters, the African Regional Health Office (AFRO) and three 
WHO country offices—the observed response was slower than if the WHO had been more 
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centralized. I then turn to the WHO’s 2014-2015 budget and examine the split between assessed 
and voluntary-specified contributions of AFRO’s budget and the budgets of the country offices 
in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.  
The WHO and AFRO were the two main bureaucracies that responded to the Ebola 
pandemic: the WHO is the world’s leading health authority, and AFRO is the African region’s 
branch of the WHO. I focus on these two bureaucracies in my analysis, as I examine the effect of 
decentralization and specific budgetary mechanisms to understand the speed of response and the 
amount of resources allocated to the Ebola outbreak. It is important to note that other 
bureaucracies, including inter-governmental organizations, humanitarian aid organizations, 
private organizations and non-governmental organizations, were involved in the response. I 
chose to limit my case study to the WHO and its Member States as they function as the WHO 
functions as the leading health authority in coordinating and responding to health emergencies.  
 
Decentralization. The more decentralized an international bureaucracy, the slower the response, 
and the fewer the resources allocated to a public health problem. The WHO system is a highly 
decentralized bureaucracy consisting of six regional offices and 150 country offices one within 
each WHO Member State (Lee, 2009:34). The phenomenon of decentralization dates back to 
before the WHO’s founding, when the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) existed as a 
separate organization that, once the WHO was established in 1948, refused to become part of the 
WHO (PAHO, 2015). The PASB subsequently became the Pan-American Health Office’s 
secretariat, following the WHO’s establishment in 1948, and provided the current model for the 
WHO’s regional offices (Clift, 2014:24). The PAHO is now classified as a regional office. 
According to Charles Clift (2014:24), a prominent scholar studying the WHO, decentralization 
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“effectively created seven WHOs rather than one” providing each regional office with a high 
degree of autonomy. Previous efforts to centralize the WHO, under “One WHO” have failed, and 
resulted in greater autonomy for regional offices, thus further decentralizing the WHO’s 
structure (Hanrieder, 2015:93).  
 The regional offices have near full autonomy to determine their own budget and program 
planning (Yamey, 2002). AFRO develops programs targeted to address regional issues such as 
polio eradication. Headquarters, however, develops its own programs that it expects all regional 
offices to also implement alongside individual regional agendas. As a result of the diverging 
roles and goals, cooperation between headquarters and AFRO often fails (Gale, Lauerman and 
Bennett, 2014). In the past AFRO has been forced to follow paths defined by the headquarters, 
rather than focus on regional health issues, such as strengthening local and national health 
systems within the region to handle pandemics more effectively (Gale, Lauerman and Bennett, 
2014). 
 The second key attribute contributing to autonomy within regional offices is the fact that 
the Member States in each region elect their own Regional Director. The only role for the WHO 
Executive Board in Geneva is “rubber stamping” the selected Regional Director following 
elections (Kelland, 2016). This other aspect of regional autonomy built into the WHO’s 
organizational structure makes it impossible for the WHO to act as a cohesive unit, particularly 
during infectious disease outbreaks (Hanrieder, 2015:105). Peter Piot, a well-known 
epidemiologist and former head of UNAIDS, points to the opaque selection process of the 
regional directors as a likely source of some of the dysfunction as the process captures specific 
interests that benefit personal agendas of the candidates (Biswas, 2014; Boseley, 2014). 
Patterson (2016) likewise notes that “the African Health Office was relatively ineffective against 
 55 
Ebola, in part because of cozy political relationships and inefficiency and because it wasn’t as 
well-funded or staffed” as other regional offices. According to Charles Clift, in his 2014 report 
on the WHO for Chatham House, the lack of direct control over AFRO from the WHO 
headquarters in Geneva was the chief reason the WHO could not respond as a coordinated unit to 
the Ebola crisis in West Africa. 
 Decentralization crippled the Ebola response, and evidence suggests that decentralization 
is causally linked to a slow response, and the small amounts of resources dedicated to the 
WHO’s limited involvement prior to the health authority issuing a PHEIC. Guinea refused to 
report its first Ebola cases to the WHO (CDC, 2014b). The Guinean Health Ministry shared 
information on confirmed cases and deaths, but withheld information on suspected cases, which 
distorted the extent of Ebola’s spread (CDC, 2014b). The Guinean economy depends on the 
country’s mining industry, and the government felt that reporting suspected cases would 
negatively impact the Guinean economy (AP, 2015). Guinea’s government ignored the 
mandatory reporting requirements under the IHR (2005) out of fear that expatriates working in 
the mining industry would flee the country (AP, 2015). 
 The governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone also downplayed the extent of the 
outbreaks in their countries as they feared similar economic repercussions (Kamradt-Scott, 
2016:408). Eventually, Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf called for international 
assistance but was harshly criticized by Sierra Leone and Guinea, which feared that her calls for 
help would alarm expatriate populations and cause them to flee from the region (Kamradt-Scott, 
2016:408). The WHO Secretariat in Geneva failed to further investigate the calls for help by 
President Sirleaf on multiple occasions after her initial plea (Kamradt-Scott, 2016:409).  
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 AFRO subsequently convened an emergency teleconference on March 25, 2014, 
relatively early in the Ebola outbreak, and suggested that the regional director declare an internal 
WHO grade 2 emergency in order to deploy a regional emergency support tasks force to provide 
support (Kamradt-Scott, 2016:408). This message never reached headquarters (Kamradt-Scott, 
ibid). 
 Director-General Margaret Chan feared that declaring a PHEIC would hurt West African 
economies, and thus provide incentive for Ebola-affected states to withhold future voluntary 
contributions to the WHO’s annual budget. Other instances show that senior directors in Geneva 
were informed about the deteriorating situation in West Africa, but refused to declare a PHEIC 
because the Director-General viewed an emergency declaration as a last resort (AP, 2015). 
According to Bruce Aylward (AP, 2015), the Director-General believed that labeling Ebola as a 
global emergency would not have done anything to address the issue, and would have instead 
hurt the economies of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. 
 WHO headquarters could not respond to the crisis because prior to March, 2014 
headquarters had little knowledge of the situation on the ground. Once headquarters knew of the 
outbreak, it dropped its responsibility to respond to the growing crisis in order to remain a 
neutral party out of fear that the three worst-affected West African states would refuse to donate 
voluntary contributions and that declaring a PHEIC would negatively impact West African 
economies (Gostin and Friedman, 2015:1903). This would only further exacerbate the WHO’s 
zero-growth budget issues. The “WHO kept saying it’s not our role to do it, we just advise the 
health ministry” (Sun et. al., 2014). Dr. Chan stated earlier in the crisis that she felt that national 
governments needed to take the lead. Dr. Laurence Gostin argues, however, that “if you have 
governments with such fragile health systems and wide distrust among its own population, WHO 
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needs to take the lead” (Flynn and Nebehay, 2014). On July 29, 2014 the WHO headquarters, 
after receiving three previous cables and ignoring them, received a fourth cable from the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Liberia that informed Geneva that the Ebola situation was 
“unprecedented and rapidly deteriorating” (Sun et. al., 2014). The country offices and AFRO, 
however, turned to the WHO for help because national health ministries could not manage the 
outbreak; this is when the UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon stepped in and created UNMEER. 
 Shortly thereafter, the WHO declared a PHEIC and it became evident from earlier 
coordination issues that the WHO system was not coordinated enough to deal with a complex 
emergency. At this point, resources began flowing into West Africa alongside technical help 
from foreign doctors and military personnel. The Security Council had to establish the United 
Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) on September 19, 2014 in order to 
provide a coordinated, and centralized response to the outbreak (WHO, 2014c:2).  The UN 
Secretary-General and WHO Director-General both recognized that earlier failures in containing 
the outbreak were a result of  “logistics capacities, air transportation, mobilizing international 
expertise, availability of adequate isolation, care and treatment facilities and essential supplies” 
and the decentralized set up of the WHO headquarters (WHO, 2014c:1). UNMEER, according to 
the Interim Ebola Assessment Panel, successfully garnered high level political and financial 
support but failed to coordinate efforts on the ground in Ebola-affected countries (WHO, 
2015b:8). UNMEER was comprised of six units that reported to the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General, Bruce Aylward, who reported directly to WHO Director-General Dr. 
Margaret Chan. The six units included Mission Support, Performance Monitoring and Reporting, 
Prevention and Preparedness, Emergency Operations and Emergency Operations Support. Dr. 
Anshu Banerjee was the Director of UNMEER’s Emergency Operations (WHO, 2014c). He set 
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up offices in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Guinea with each one led by an Ebola Crisis Manager 
who reported directly to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (WHO, 2014c). 
 The evidence suggests that the WHO’s decentralized structure contributed to a slow 
response due to coordination issues. The WHO’s decentralized structure, however, did not vary 
across cases so while decentralization is important to the Ebola case, decentralization alone 
cannot explain the difference in WHO and Member State responses between the Ebola and Zika 
cases. The decentralized structure resulted in significant autonomy for AFRO, whose Member 
States did not have sufficient financial and medical resources to operate independently from 
WHO headquarters. In the final section of this case study, I turn to the budgetary mechanisms of 
the WHO as the last explanation for understanding the speed of the response and the amount of 
resources that WHO and its Member States allocated to the Ebola response.  
 
Budgetary mechanisms. I hypothesize that the more the budgeting mechanism allows states to 
voluntarily fund public health issues on a case by case basis, and the less these contributions are 
made mandatory, the slower the response and the fewer resources allocated to the response. The 
WHO has had a zero-growth budget for assessed contributions since the early 1980s forcing 
Member States to rely on a funding category called “extra-budgetary funds,” which include 
voluntary-specified contributions from individual Member States. In addition to voluntary-
specified contributions, private and humanitarian organizations and other United Nations 
agencies allocate additional funds to the programs of their choice.  
 First, I analyze the composition of AFRO’s budget, and outline whether the 
Preparedness, Surveillance and Response categories that are outlined in the overall WHO budget 
are funded by assessed or voluntary-specified contributions. These Preparedness, Surveillance 
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and Response categories are: 1) emergency risk management, 2) epidemic- and pandemic-prone 
diseases, 3) outbreak and crisis response, and 4) alert and response capacities. Second, I separate 
the budgets of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea into assessed contributions and voluntary-
specified contributions, paying specific attention to the four categories that I identify above, in 
order to discern whether financing emergency response operations from voluntary-specified 
contributions is problematic for speed and level of response. 
 AFRO’s 2014-2015 budget was $331.24 million and was made up of 24.1 percent 
voluntary specified contributions ($79.7 million USD) and 22.7 percent assessed contributions 
($75.29 million USD) (WHO, 2016k). The remainder of AFRO’s budget is comprised of funds 
from private organizations, other UN organs, and non-governmental organizations, which each 
contribute a small percentage to AFRO’s larger budget and are separate from assessed and 
voluntary-specified contributions. AFRO spends none of its assessed contributions on outbreak 
and crisis response. As percentages of its overall budget, AFRO spent small amounts on 
epidemic- and pandemic-prone diseases ($2.70 million USD, 4 percent), emergency risk and 
crisis management ($1.78 million USD, 2.6 percent), and alert and response capacity ($1.31 
million USD, 1.9 percent) (WHO, 2016k). While there is no official data, the small amounts that 
AFRO spends on these three pandemic response categories suggests that AFRO relies on country 
offices to handle infectious disease outbreaks within its territories. Alternatively, the low level of 
spending by AFRO could be evidence that the organization relies on outside contributions from 
international organizations and non-regional WHO Member States in the event of a health 
emergency in the African region.  
 From examining the budgets of the three country offices based on assessed and voluntary 
contributions I find that the four crisis response sub-categories were funded through voluntary 
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contributions made by WHO Member States. The voluntary contribution mechanism allows 
Member States to scale up their donations for public health events when a health crisis erupts.  
 The country offices have substantially smaller budgets from which to operate. Liberia 
received $2.42 million USD in assessed contributions with $63,000 USD allocated to outbreak 
and crisis response, while the three other categories received less than 0.1 percent of assessed 
contributions (WHO, 2016k). Liberia received $59.85 million USD in voluntary-specified 
contributions for 2014-2015 with $48.05 million USD or 96.9 percent of Liberia’s assessed 
contributions spent on outbreak and crisis response (WHO, 2016k). Voluntary-specified 
contributions did not fund any of the remaining three categories (WHO, 2016k). 
 Guinea received $3.16 million USD in assessed contributions and spent the most on 
leadership and governance. Within the Preparedness, Surveillance and Response subcategories, 
Outbreak and Crisis response in Guinea received $94,000 USD from assessed contributions with 
the three other subcategories receiving minimal amounts from assessed contributions (WHO, 
2016k). Guinea received $44.96 million USD in voluntary-specified contributions, with $33.27 
million USD (93.9 percent of Guinea’s voluntary-specified contributions) dedicated to outbreak 
and crisis response (WHO, 2016k). Guinea did not spend any more of its voluntary-specified 
contributions on Preparedness, Surveillance and Response sub-categories (WHO, 2016k).  
 Lastly, Sierra Leone received $2.5 million USD in assessed contributions, and no 
assessed contributions were allocated to outbreak and crisis response (WHO, 2016k). Emergency 
risk and crisis management received $62,620 USD and epidemic- and pandemic-prone diseases 
received $28,000 USD from Sierra Leone’s assessed contributions (WHO, 2016k).  It did not 
spend any of its assessed contributions on other sub-categories in Preparedness, Surveillance and 
Response (WHO, 2016k). 
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 Conversely, Sierra Leone received $35.75 million USD in voluntary-specified contributions, and 
spent $30.58 million USD or 93.4 percent on outbreak and crisis response (WHO, 2016k). 
 
Office  Assessed Contributions  Voluntary Specified Contributions  
AFRO $79.7 million USD  $75.29 million USD  
Liberia  $2.42 million USD $59.85 million USD  
Liberia: Preparedness, 
Surveillance and Response 
Outbreak and Crisis Response: 
$63,000 USD  
Outbreak and Crisis Response:  
$48.05 million USD 
Guinea  $3.16 million USD  $44.96 million USD 
Guinea: Preparedness,  
Surveillance and Response 
Outbreak and Crisis Response: 
$94, 000 USD 
Outbreak and Crisis Response:  
$33.27 million USD  
Sierra Leone  $2.5 million USD  $35.75 million USD 
Sierra Leone: Preparedness, 
Surveillance and Response  
Emergency Risk and Crisis 
Management:  
$62, 620 USD  
Epidemic- and Pandemic-
Prone Diseases: $28,000 USD 
Outbreak and Crisis Response:  
$30.58 million USD 
 
 Given the budget evidence, it is clear that Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea relied on 
voluntary-specified contributions to respond to the Ebola outbreak. The three worst-affected 
countries each spent approximately 90 percent of their voluntary-specified funds on outbreak and 
crisis response (WHO, 2016k). The amount of funds overall proved insufficient to contain the 
outbreak, as the financial support came too late to effectively stem the tide of Ebola transmission 
(WHO, 2015b:6). The WHO and Member State response was slow and lacked resources as a 
result of the WHO, AFRO and country-office budgets being comprised of mainly voluntary-
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specified contributions that began to arrive in large sums only after the WHO declared Ebola a 
PHEIC. The voluntary contributions mechanism allowed Member States to quickly scale up the 
response once they recognized Ebola as a threat to international security.  
 Further compounding the problems created by reliance on voluntary-specified 
contributions is the disrepair of health systems in the three most affected countries. The WHO 
headquarters delegates to the country offices the task of being the first line of defense against 
infectious disease outbreaks, however the WHO budget prevents country offices and AFRO from 
fulfilling this task. Decentralization, thus, in tandem with the WHO’s budgetary mechanisms, 
produced an initially slow, and resource-poor response from the WHO and its Member States. 
The United States published a report titled “U.S. and International Health responses to the Ebola 
Outbreak in West Africa” which concluded that “insufficient financial resources to fund local 
responses and pay health personnel” had contributed to “human resource and commodity 
shortages” (Salaam-Blyther, 2014:5).  
While financial resources may explain part of the response, the poor health infrastructure 
within the three worst affected states is another point to consider. In Liberia, for instance, the 
country has only 173 doctors, according to the Liberia Medical and Dental Council (Sieff, 2014). 
Other sources, such as the Liberian Ambassador to the United States, say that the number is 
closer to fifty, meaning that there is only one doctor for every 90, 000 Liberians (Sieff, 2014). In 
Guinea the information on health personnel per 10,000 people is not available, while in Sierra 
Leone there are 1.9 health personnel per 10,000 people (Salaam-Blyther, 2014:6). Local and 
foreign doctors responding to the outbreak in mid to late 2014 were left with no choice but to 
conduct exams on potential Ebola cases without personal protective equipment and outside of 
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specially designed treatment units (Sieff, 2014). The result was more Ebola cases and a reduction 
in medical personnel (Sieff, 2014).  
 In addition to the composition of the WHO’s budget, reductions in staff due to budgetary 
concerns likely contributed to the slow Ebola response. The first area targeted for job cuts was at 
headquarters and at the African Regional Health Office between 2011 and 2012. Headquarters 
eliminated 495 posts with 235 of these jobs housed at AFRO. The job cuts at AFRO were 
“informed by a financial vulnerability analysis” according to the WHO Executive Board (WHO, 
2012:2). Dr. Margaret Chan declared that the WHO would “do more with less” and continue to 
expand its mandate despite downsizing (WHO, 2012:2). The WHO justified job cuts to improve 
the independence, professionalism, fairness, and timeliness at both the headquarters and at 
AFRO (WHO, 2012:6). Reducing WHO staff at both headquarters and AFRO resulted in too 
much work, and too few people to do it. The drastic reduction in staff at AFRO is one potential 
explanation for the five-month delay in the WHO response after Guinea reported its first Ebola 
cases to headquarters in late March 2014.  
 The cuts in emergency response personnel at AFRO could have resulted in a slower 
response as AFRO scrambled to coordinate sufficient personnel trained in emergency response to 
help contain the Ebola epidemic. There were no core funds reserved for emergency response, and 
the Interim Ebola Assessment Panel argued that this contributed to the WHO’s slow response, 
which lacked sufficient resources to handle a rapidly evolving outbreak (WHO, 2012:6). The 
budget issue exacerbated the problem of decentralization. Dr. Luis Sambo, then director of 
AFRO, was in charge of AFRO’s spending and key decisions. Evidence suggests that Sambo 
was incompetent, and the incompetence of a single individual leading the organization primarily 
responsible for dealing with the Ebola outbreak led to a total breakdown in coordination, 
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funding, and emergency response. At the same time, if AFRO were not an autonomous organ of 
the WHO, and if Dr. Luis Sambo had been a member of the larger WHO bureaucracy, his 
incompetence would not have resulted in total failure. Centralization might help pick up the 
slack where leadership fails in the regional offices. While the WHO headquarters delegate a 
significant amount of autonomy to AFRO, the regional office lacks the capacity to fully accept 
the responsibility of containing an outbreak like Ebola. The health systems within Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are severely under-funded and under-staffed for the number of people 
they serve. Decentralization and budget explanations are tightly interconnected, and the two 
processes create issues where agencies that are tasked as the primary responders, namely AFRO 
and the country offices in the affected Member States, lack the capacity to respond quickly and 
with enough resources to quell a major outbreak.  
 Evidence supports the hypotheses about decentralization and budgetary mechanisms: 
throughout the WHO and Member State response to the Ebola crisis, the WHO’s decentralized 
structure (H4a) was a barrier to a quick response. This led to the PHEIC declaration eight months 
after the initial outbreak. The effects of the WHO’s budgetary mechanisms (H5a, H5b) on the 
speed of WHO and Member State response is also clear. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, 
along with AFRO, did not receive much in the way of assessed contributions that they could 
allocate to emergency response sub-categories; there were too many other categories that these 
country offices had to fund. As a result, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea relied on voluntary-
specified contributions that only came into the region once the WHO declared the PHEIC. 
Evidence thus suggests that the initially slow and resource-poor response is causally related to 
the budgetary mechanism. Other aspects of the budget and budgetary considerations such as 
reduction in staff due to budget cuts, and lack of health infrastructure played a role in the WHO 
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and Member States’ slow, limited response. At the same time, decentralization and the main 
budget mechanism that allows WHO Member States to choose when and whether to provide 
funds for public health issues does not vary across my two cases. These similarities limits their 
explanatory value in helping us understand why the Ebola and Zika responses varied so 
significantly. 
 
2016 Zika Pandemic in the Americas  
Establishing the dependent variables: speed of response and amount of resources procured 
The first cases of local transmission of the Zika virus were reported in Brazil in May 2015.   
Since then, more than twenty countries in the Americas have reported local transmission 
(Ladhani et. al., 2016:600). Soon after Brazil reported its first local transmission, Colombia also 
began to report cases of local transmission. The PAHO declared a regional emergency in May 
2015 and released advice to the affected Member States (PAHO, 2016c). The PAHO began 
coordinating an emergency response, which it modeled on previous mosquito-borne virus 
outbreaks in the region involving dengue and chikungunya (PAHO, 2016c). Devi Sridhar, a 
professor of global public health at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, stated that “the 
World Health Organization is only as strong as the regional office in charge,” an important 
statement to consider in analyzing the PAHO’s response to Zika (Whitman, 2016). The PAHO’s 
prior experience and strong leadership of Regional Director Carissa Etienne led the regional 
office to model the Zika response on previous responses to chikungunya (PAHO, 2016c). 
In October 2015, four months after the initial reports of local transmission in Brazil reached 
the PAHO, Brazil reported an increased number of infants being born with microcephaly in its 
northern Pernambuco state (Ladhani et al, 2016:600). Microcephaly is a congenital neurological 
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abnormality resulting in smaller skull and brain size in infants (Landhani et al., 2016:600). Once 
the number of Zika cases exploded and began spreading rapidly throughout Central and South 
America during the summer and fall of 2015, the WHO responded quickly with its PHEIC 
despite having no scientific evidence of a demonstrated link between Zika and microcephaly. 
Many health professionals and news reports focused on the treacherous “down-stream effects” 
on newborn babies, in reference to microcephaly (Whitman, 2016). Microcephaly occurs as a 
birth defect during pregnancy where a baby is born with a much smaller head than is normal. 
Microcephaly can result when a baby’s brain does not develop properly during pregnancy, or 
stops growing after birth (CDC, 2016e).  Babies born with microcephaly often experience severe 
neurological problems throughout their lives such as seizures, hearing and vision problems, 
coordination and balance issues, intellectual disabilities, and developmental delays such as 
learning to speak or walk (CDC, 2016e). Scientists researching the Zika virus and its effects on 
pregnant women believe that the risk for an unborn baby to have microcephaly is highest in the 
first trimester, being between one and thirteen percent (Schnirring, 2016). 
Brazil, El Salvador, and Venezuela shortly thereafter reported an alarming number of patients 
with Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS), a neurological disorder that causes short and long term 
paralysis (Ladhani et. al., 2016:600). By December 2015 Brazil reported 56,318 suspected cases 
of Zika virus in 29 states (WHO, 2016e:8). On December 8, 2015 the PAHO Director Carissa 
Etienne activated the Incident Management System (PAHO, 2016a). The PAHO subsequently 
alerted the WHO headquarters to the rise in microcephaly cases despite there being no 
scientifically demonstrated link between Zika virus and microcephaly. The increasing alarm 
within the region led the WHO Director-General to declare the clusters of microcephaly and 
GBS a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). The WHO expressed 
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particular concern of the long-term health and economic consequences for the governments and 
citizens of the affected countries. This emergency declaration came four months after the link 
with microcephaly was first hypothesized (Rathi, 2016).  
The time from initial reports of Zika transmission and subsequent increase in microcephaly 
and GBS to the time when the WHO declared a PHEIC was approximately eight months. At the 
time of the PHEIC declaration, the WHO estimated that there were approximately one million 
cases of Zika in 28 countries in the Americas. By June 2016 microcephaly and other nervous 
system disorders thought to be related to Zika virus infection had been reported in twelve 
countries and territories in Central and South America, plus reports from Slovenia, Spain, and 
the United States of babies born with microcephaly from mothers who had travelled previously 
to countries with current Zika transmission (WHO, 2016e:9). Though Zika is not a highly lethal 
virus, it is extremely transmissible because it is carried by mosquitoes that know no borders. The 
main risk with Zika is its capacity to infect hundreds of thousands of people some of whom may 
be expecting mothers.  
For the remainder of the case study I first proceed with the epidemiological explanation for 
the Zika response. I examine the impact of lethality and transmissibility on the speed and amount 
of resources allocated to the response. I then turn to two political approaches for understanding 
the WHO and Member States’ response to Zika. I employ the logic of securitization theory to 
understand the extent to which Zika was securitized and how this impacted on the amount of 
resources allocated to the response. Finally, I look at the WHO’s decentralization and budgetary 
mechanisms to assess the impact of organizational and budgetary structure on the speed of the 
WHO and Member State response to the Zika outbreak. I argue that Zika did not receive a quick 
response or many resources because it failed to become a security issue. As a result, WHO 
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Member States did not dedicate additional voluntary-specified contributions to the countries 
affected by the Zika outbreak.  
 
Epidemiological explanation for the Zika response. The more lethal and easily transmissible the 
disease, the quicker and more resource plentiful the WHO and its Member States’ response 
should be. Conversely, if a disease is less lethal and less easily transmissible, the WHO and its 
Member States will respond slower and allocate fewer resources to the response. In the following 
section I assess the lethality and transmissibility of the Zika virus and how these two independent 
variables affect the speed of response and resources allocated by the WHO and its Member 
States. I find that though Zika is a highly transmissible virus, it is not a lethal virus. As a result, 
the epidemiological explanation produces inconclusive predictions that require further political 
explanations. Examining lethality and transmissibility of Zika in greater detail as I do in this 
section provides greater understanding of the complexity of international health emergency 
responses.  
There is no measured case fatality rate for Zika because most people who are infected either 
experience no or very mild symptoms, and almost everyone recovers quickly. According to 
Ladhani et al. (2016:800) 80 percent of those infected with Zika remain asymptomatic and those 
who do develop symptoms experience mild muscle aches, headache, or fever for a period of four 
to seven days. A very small proportion of people infected with the Zika virus in the most recent 
outbreak have suffered from GBS, which is a nervous system disorder where the immune system 
attacks areas of the nervous system (CDC, 2017a). The syndrome destroys the myelin sheath 
surrounding axons on peripheral nerves, thus inhibiting transmission of nerve signals and 
resulting in temporary or long-term paralysis.   
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Some individuals with underlying health conditions, however, have died from Zika. Though 
doctors hypothesize that the small number of deaths are Zika-related, they have not been able to 
demonstrate a causal linkage between the virus and subsequent death as a result of underlying 
health issues. In April 2016 a man in his seventies with Zika died primarily from internal 
bleeding that doctors say could have been a “rare immune reaction to the virus” (Fox, 2016). 
Later, in July 2016, an elderly Zika-infected patient at a Utah hospital died, however he had 
underlying medical conditions that made it impossible for doctors to determine the definitive 
cause of death (Goldschmidt, 2016a). Though the link between Zika and neurological 
abnormalities was unclear, in March 2016 researchers from Johns Hopkins University, Florida 
State University, and Emory University found overwhelming evidence that Zika leads to birth 
defects in fetuses (Dennis and Sun, 2016). 
Though Zika is not highly lethal, it is a highly transmissible virus because it is spread 
through a common species of mosquito known as the Aedes aegypti. This species of mosquito 
resides in Central and South America as well as in the Caribbean. Though primarily transmitted 
through the Aedes aegypti, Zika can also be transmitted through sexual contact with an infected 
individual (CDC, 2017a). The Zika virus remains in the bloodstream of an infected individual for 
approximately a week after initially contracting the virus. (CDC, 2017b). In some cases, 
however, Zika RNA was detectable in the blood up to 54 days after the individual was initially 
infected (Rosen, 2017). Adding to the confusion over Zika’s longevity in the human body, recent 
studies demonstrated that the Zika virus can remain in semen for up to three months. This 
finding raised concerns about continual Zika virus transmission even after health authorities 
quell mosquito populations (Rosen, 2017). Due to the high numbers of babies born with 
microcephaly, particularly in Brazil and Colombia, national health systems will be strained as 
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they deal with larger numbers of patients requiring intensive medical care. As microcephaly is a 
life-long condition, parents and caregivers will also have to care for children born with 
microcephaly, which could impact on their ability to work outside of the home. As of March 
2016 the WHO predicted that 2,500 babies would be born with microcephaly if the current trends 
continue throughout 2017 (Sun, 2016b), 
Given the long-term neurological effects that are linked to Zika, the virus represents a 
much different threat than the Ebola virus. While it is much less lethal, it is highly transmissible. 
The Zika virus does not hurt the majority of people it affects, yet it has the potential to cause 
long-term consequences for babies born with microcephaly, a life-long condition with larger 
economic consequences for governments. Parents and national health and education systems will 
face greater economic challenges in caring for and educating growing numbers of children with 
severe developmental delays and other health complications related to microcephaly.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the hypotheses on lethality and transmissibility 
produce inconclusive predictions. The high transmissibility of Zika necessitates a quick and 
resource-rich response from the WHO and its Member States. On the other hand Zika’s low 
lethality should lead to a slower response with fewer resources allocated by the WHO and its 
Member States. Further explanations that focus on the politics of securitization and bureaucratic 
structure are necessary to develop a more complete understanding.  
 
Securitization explanation for the Zika response. When securitizing actors emerge and frame an 
outbreak in a persuasive way, this should lead the WHO and its Member States to allocate more 
physical and financial resources to the emergency (H3a). When no securitizing actors emerge, 
however, the outbreak will not be securitized and will remain a public health issue, resulting in 
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fewer resources allocated to the outbreak (H3b).  In this section I assess the extent to which Zika 
was securitized. I examine statements from national leaders and international organizations along 
with media reports to identify potential securitizing actors and security language. Based on the 
predictions of securitization theory, I expect that if Zika were fully securitized large amounts of 
financial resources would flow to the affected states from the WHO and its Member States. I find 
that Zika was not securitized—that is, securitizing actors did not effectively reframe the outbreak 
as a security issue.  Instead, the outbreak remained a public health concern that necessitated a 
long-term response and as a result received few resources from the WHO and its Member States. 
Affected Member States were left to regional and national strategies despite WHO headquarter 
involvement in the coordination of the response and disbursal of financial resources.  
The PAHO treated Zika as a regional emergency beginning in May 2015 (Kelland, 2016). 
Prior to notifying the WHO headquarters, the PAHO issued a statement on Zika describing the 
virus’s potential to infect millions (Kelland, 2016). In November 2015 the Brazilian government 
declared that Zika constituted a “national emergency” due to its unprecedented spread, however 
the government did not cite any other security concerns resulting from Zika (WHO, 2016e:8). On 
January 28, 2016 Laurie Garrett quoted the minister of health in Brazil, Marcelo Castro, as 
saying that Zika “has already gone from being an epidemic to an endemic disease… meaning 
Zika may now be a permanent feature of the nation’s ecology” (Garrett, 2016). Garrett ended the 
Foreign Policy article by saying that “public health leaders and politicians had better brace for a 
very long haul on Zika,” suggesting that Zika was not an emergency but a long-term public 
health issue.  Such a health issue would require a sustained response, rather than a surging 
response similar to the WHO Ebola response in 2014 (Garrett, 2016). 
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Also in January 2016 Jeremy Farrar, the head of the Wellcome Trust, said that the Zika 
outbreak was even worse than the Ebola outbreak because of its potential negative consequences 
for pregnant women and their unborn babies (McKie, 2016). Farrar also did not speak about Zika 
as a security issue; he just emphasized the negative long-term consequences for pregnant women 
and babies. The WHO announced a PHEIC shortly after the dramatic rise in the number of 
microcephaly and GBS in Brazil and Colombia in the latter half of 2015. The WHO declared the 
clusters of microcephaly and GBS a PHEIC on February 1, 2016 despite the fact that there was 
no evidence that Zika was the cause of the growing number of microcephaly and GBS cases in 
Zika-affected countries. Importantly, the Zika virus was not the rationale behind the PHEIC; the 
increasing cases of microcephaly and GBS were the primary determination for the Emergency 
Committee on Zika to declare a PHEIC to draw international attention to the outbreak (WHO, 
2016e:8). In their statement, the Emergency Committee justified the PHEIC as the clusters 
occurred in areas newly infected with Zika virus, and there was no other plausible explanation 
for the clusters of microcephaly and GBS (WHO, 2016i). The WHO did not use any security 
language to describe the Zika outbreak, but instead emphasized its long-term effects on those 
affected by microcephaly and GBS (WHO, 2016i). By March 22, 2016 Margaret Chan stated 
that “the status of Zika has changed from a mild medical curiosity to a disease with severe public 
health implications” (WHO, 2016i). 
The WHO subsequently released the Zika Strategic Response Plan in June 2016 in which 
the Director General explicitly stated that Zika was a “global health emergency” as a result of its 
“profound mobility” and “risk profile [that] has changed from a mild threat to one with serious 
consequences” (WHO, 2016e:5). The report also framed the Zika virus as a “new type of health 
threat” that “required a unique and integrated response strategy” however made no mention of 
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Zika as a security threat (WHO, 2016e:5). Part of the rationale behind announcing Zika as a 
health emergency was to intensify research efforts to identify possible links between the Zika 
virus and other neurological and congenital malformations as these links were not well 
understood (WHO, 2016l). 
 Contrary to earlier discourse from affected governments, health writers, and the WHO, 
Vice Presidential candidate Tim Kaine classified Zika as a “national security issue” (Gostin and 
Hodge, 2016:1100). His rhetoric echoed earlier framing from U.S. Health Secretary Sylvia 
Burwell who explicitly stated that “Zika has a significant potential to affect the security of U.S. 
citizens” (Gostin and Hodge, 2016:1100). Gostin and Hodge (2016), two prominent global health 
researchers, similarly characterized Zika as a national and global health security threat (Gostin 
and Hodge, 2016:1100). Gostin and Hodge (2016:1100) explicitly stated that they called Zika a 
national and global health security threat to encourage greater resource allocation.  
American news outlets, in particular, portrayed the Zika outbreak as a highly dangerous 
virus whose effects on newborn babies were much more common than scientific evidence 
demonstrates (CDC, 2016a). The risk of a baby being born with microcephaly to a Zika-infected 
mother is between one and thirteen percent, thus representing a minority of babies who are born 
to mothers who were infected with the Zika virus during pregnancy (Sun, 2016a). Mainstream 
media focused on images of mothers holding infants with microcephaly as if to demonstrate that 
any pregnant woman infected with Zika would give birth to a baby with microcephaly 
(Halvorssen, 2016). One CNN report announced that Zika is “prompting worldwide concern 
because of an alarming connection to a neurological birth disorder and its rapid spread across the 
globe.” Even though microcephaly cases were increasing, calling microcephaly “rapidly 
spread[ing]” was a stretch given it was only affecting between one and thirteen percent of babies 
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born to mothers who had the virus (LaMotte, 2016). The media particularly emphasized Zika’s 
impact on major events such as the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and professional golf 
events. Several male golfers dropped out of international tournaments to protect their wives from 
potentially contracting Zika through sexual intercourse (Bonesteel, 2016).  
Other circulating stories within the American media focused on Zika’s purported 
“deadliness.” CNN reported on three Zika-deaths in Venezuela and one in Utah, however left out 
key details to make the deaths appear to be a result of the virus. Headlines made it seem as if 
Zika was definitively the leading cause of death, when other factors also played a role 
(Halvorssen, 2016). In the Venezuelan cases the report failed to mention the lack of adequate 
medical supplies to treat those infected with Zika and in the Utah case CNN did not concede that 
the man had a pre-existing medical condition that made determining his cause of death 
impossible (Karimi, 2016).  
The American media also reported heavily on local transmission once Zika began 
spreading throughout Miami. Reports on local transmission in Miami, one of the most heavily 
infected places in the continental United States, failed to mention that despite there being a high 
number of Zika cases due to local transmission, none of the infected people were hospitalized 
since most recovered from Zika without medical attention (CDC, 2017b). The media also did not 
focus on why the WHO declared a PHEIC; the PHEIC was not declared about Zika, but the 
babies being born with microcephaly, and the sharp increase in the number of people with 
Guillain-Barre Syndrome rather than the virus itself. The media reaction, in particular in the 
United States stoked fear within the American public leading many to believe that the virus 
caused birth defects in all babies born to Zika-infected mothers and that death as a result of Zika 
was also likely. 
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The security frames put forth by Burwell, Kaine, Gostin and Hodge, and the American 
media did not become the prevailing frame for the Zika outbreak. Contrary to earlier 
characterizations of Zika as a security threat, epidemiologist, D.A. Henderson who had led 
earlier programs to eradicate smallpox, in December 2016 advised the Obama Administration 
that Zika’s threat to the United States did not warrant the fear and concern that it had triggered 
(Cohen, 2016). Henderson further characterized the United States government reaction as 
disproportionate to the threat level since most people who get Zika do not even know they have 
it (Cohen, 2016).  
Following the initial framing of Zika as a new and highly transmissible global public 
health issue that required additional research to be fully understood, the fifth meeting of the 
Emergency Committee on Zika on November 18, 2016 ended the PHEIC for microcephaly and 
GBS related to Zika.  Instead, the statement from the meeting urged affected countries that a 
long-term plan for Zika would be necessary as health and education systems would have to bear 
the burden of more children with neurological complications and cognitive delays as a result of 
microcephaly (WHO, 2016b). The report also stipulated that affected Member States in 
collaboration with the WHO required a “sustained programme… with dedicated resources to 
address the long-term nature of the disease and its associated consequences” (WHO, 2016b). The 
framing of Zika and its related long-term effects as requiring both a short and long term approach 
suggests that Zika did not become a security threat, but remained a public health issue (WHO, 
2016b).  
The WHO’s decision to announce a PHEIC for the clusters of microcephaly and GBS 
thought to be linked to the Zika virus is likely path-dependent based on the WHO’s late response 
to the Ebola virus in 2014. Two years earlier, the WHO faced harsh criticism for the 
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Organization’s slow response to the Ebola virus in West Africa, possibly prompting the WHO to 
quickly address the Zika outbreak even though Zika has mild effects for the majority of 
individuals infected. Similar arguments were made contrasting the WHO’s response to H1N1 in 
2009 and Ebola in 2014 (WHO, 2010). The WHO was harshly criticized for causing what many 
Member States viewed as unnecessary alarm when it announced H1N1 constituted a PHEIC 
(WHO, 2010). In response to the Ebola crisis the WHO, it could be argued, waited to declare a 
PHEIC to avoid similar criticism. Then in the case of the Zika virus, due to previous criticism 
that the WHO had not responded quickly enough to Ebola, the international organization decided 
to respond as early as possible.  
Since the WHO announced the PHEIC on February 1, 2016 and implemented its 
Strategic Response Framework and Join Operations Plan beginning on February 14 2016, the 
total amount of funding from February to July 2016 increased from the initial $56 million USD 
(WHO, 2016n:5). The WHO and Member State response to the Zika crisis lacked resources. 
Funding requests show glaring gaps between the funds requested and the funds actually received. 
Following the PHEIC declaration, the WHO’s Contingency Fund, an emergency fund 
established following the Ebola pandemic, released $3.8 million USD to implement the first 
stages of the WHO’s Strategic Response Framework (WHO, 2016n:5).  
The WHO acknowledged in its report announcing the Strategic Response Framework that 
the funding received did not come close to the funding that was requested. The WHO requested 
$17,721,484 USD and received $2,338,084 USD, leaving a funding gap of $15,383,400 USD 
(WHO, 2016n:6). For the WHO to implement its Zika Strategic Response Framework and Joint 
Operations Plan for the period of July 2016-December 2017, the WHO report stipulated that 
$122.1 million USD would be required (WHO, 2016m). The PAHO experienced a similar 
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funding gap after the regional arm for the Americas requested $8,132,000 USD, and received a 
mere $1,640,000 USD leaving a funding gap of $6,492,000 USD when the WHO published the 
Strategic Response report in May 2016 (WHO, 2016n:7). The PAHO estimated its total budget 
for all objectives, including detection, reducing risk exposure, support response, promoting 
coordination and developing a research agenda at $17,300,000 USD Other organs within the 
WHO and United Nations, such as the UN Development Programme and the UN Population 
fund also experience glaring funding gaps (PAHO, 2016a:4). The UNDP requested $4,175,000 
and received only $40,000 while the UNPF requested $9,600,000 and receive $250,000 USD 
(WHO, 2016n:8-9). Additionally, the UN Secretary General Ban-ki Moon created the Multi-
Partner Trust Fund for Zika, which was subsequently administered by the UN Development 
Programme to centralize the financing for the overall Zika response (WHO, 2016n:8). 
In the end, however, Zika received few resources from the WHO and its Member States, 
as I argue they were not convinced that Zika was a security issue. Had Zika been fully 
securitized, we would expect to see large amounts of financial resources dedicated to the 
emergency response. Instead, WHO Member States were reluctant to allocate resources to 
respond to Zika.  Characterizing Zika as a long-term public health issue requires a steadier, 
years-long stream of resources to address health and economic consequences of the Zika virus. 
Securitization theory on its own cannot explain the WHO and Member states’ response to the 
Zika outbreak. One final explanation that focuses on the WHO’s decentralized structure and 
budgetary mechanisms, provides additional insight into the politics of responding to international 
health emergencies.  
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Organization structure and budget explanation. This section proceeds in two sub-sections. First, 
I address the issue of decentralization and how the WHO’s decentralized network of headquarter, 
regional, and country offices results in a slower WHO and Member State response. Second, I 
move to the budget explanation where I examine the composition of the PAHO’s budget, and the 
Brazilian and Colombian country office budgets. Similar to the Ebola case, I look for the four 
sub-categories within the larger budget category of Preparedness, Surveillance and Response 
within the assessed and voluntary-specified contributions of the PAHO and each regional office 
budget.   
 
Decentralization. Building on the logic of organizational theory and principal-agent approaches, 
I predict that when the bureaucratic structure of an organization is more decentralized, the 
organization’s response to an outbreak will be slower. Alternatively, the more centralized the 
bureaucratic structure the quicker the organization will respond. I argue that the WHO’s 
decentralization is the same across both the Ebola and Zika cases, however the difference in 
response is a result of stronger leadership at the PAHO.  
As noted in the previous case study on Ebola, the WHO is a highly decentralized 
bureaucracy. The decentralization variable does not vary between the two cases, as the WHO’s 
structure did not become more centralized following the Ebola pandemic. The Pan-American 
Health Office (PAHO) was the regional arm of the WHO responsible for handling the Zika 
outbreak. The quicker response from the PAHO does not relate to greater centralization, but to 
stronger leadership at the PAHO versus AFRO’s leadership during the 2014 Ebola crisis.  
The PAHO had an existing emergency coordination mechanism in the form of its 
Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), which functions as the PAHO’s centralized location to 
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coordinate and control health emergency responses (WHO, 2017b). The PAHO also has two 
separate task forces: the Disaster Task Force and Epidemic Alert and Response Task Force 
which operate through the EOC framework. The EOC then collects, analyzes and disseminates 
information to PAHO Member States in the event of a health crisis. The EOC publishes weekly 
reports, moreover, even during periods of no health emergencies, to update regional Member 
States of any new and emerging health threats.  The Center carried out this function during the 
Zika outbreak (WHO, 2017b).  
Alongside the strong leadership and existing emergency coordination at the PAHO, 
developments in emergency response coordination at WHO headquarters are crucial to consider 
in evaluating the WHO and Member states’ response to Zika. Both the Health Emergencies 
Programme and its Contingency Emergency Fund were established in the wake of the Ebola 
response to improve on coordination and financial shortcomings that became evident as the 
Ebola outbreak continued through 2015 and 2016. In a March 2016 progress report on the 
development of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme, the report acknowledges that 
“evaluations of the Ebola crisis… emphasized the need to use ‘familiar’ emergency coordination 
mechanisms in future and to leverage the investments that donors and agencies have made in 
such entities” (WHO, 2016g:4). 
The WHO established the WHO Health Emergencies Programme in cooperation with all 
six Regional Directors to streamline the workforce, budget, rules, and chain of authority under a 
single framework for emergency response (WHO, 2016g:6). The new Programme has a single 
budget and staff plan that is developed in consultation with regional directors and senior WHO 
staff (WHO, 2016g:3; Zintzmeyer, 2017).  The Health Emergencies Programme created a single 
set of standard operations procedures for rapid disbursements of funds from the newly created 
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WHO Contingency Emergency Fund (CEF) that was finalized in February 2016 and ready in 
time for the Zika response (WHO, 2016g:1).  
The global response to Zika was coordinated through the WHO headquarters when it 
activated the Incident Management System (IMS); the IMS was another new program created in 
the wake of the Ebola outbreak, to coordinate the international, regional and country level 
responses by assigning responsibility to each level on the basis of the WHO-designated threat 
level (WHO, 2016e:12). The Incident Management System, based on the level of health threat 
(Grade 1 being the lowest threat level, and Grade 3 being the highest) dictates which level of the 
organization is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the response (Zintzmeyer, 2017). A 
Grade 3 emergency, such as Zika, places all coordinating responsibility with headquarters. The 
IMS, essentially creates a separate hierarchy that aligns the directors at headquarters, regional 
offices and country offices to form a clearly delineated chain of command and direct 
responsibility to one level within the organization (Zintzmeyer, 2017). Within 10 days of the 
PHEIC declaration the WHO headquarters, the organizational level responsible for coordinating 
the Zika response as per new IMS guidelines, coordinated efforts across 23 agencies to respond 
to the Zika outbreak (WHO, 2016g:7). Ultimately, the reformed emergency and response system 
coordinated WHO expertise with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA). OCHA then deployed staff to assist with inter-agency coordination and communication 
amongst 23 United Nations agencies, and prepare a Zika strategic response plan, and budget 
within ten days of the PHEIC declaration (WHO, 2016g:7).  
As of March 2016, however, the Programme remains critically underfunded after 
receiving only $26.60 million USD in funds and pledges out of the $100 million USD target. 
Only $6.89 million USD, as of March 25 2016 had been disbursed to handle four other crises in 
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addition to the Zika virus (the other crises were: Cyclone Winston, El Niño effect in Ethiopia, 
deteriorating health conditions in Libya as a result of the ongoing civil war and Yellow Fever 
outbreak) (WHO, 2016g:6). Since the March 30, 2016 progress report on the Emergencies 
Programme there have been no further reports on progress (WHO, 2016g). 
Given the evidence from the Zika case, decentralization did not appear to slow the response. 
Rather the decentralized nature of the organization allowed the PAHO’s strong leadership to 
respond autonomously within the Americas even before the WHO recognized the need for 
international involvement. The strong leadership within the PAHO was able to draw attention 
towards the Zika outbreak, which likely encouraged a quick response from the WHO and its 
Member States even though Zika was not securitized.  
 
Budget. When there are more available assessed contributions for emergency response, the WHO 
and its Member States should respond quickly to the outbreak (H5b). Conversely, the fewer the 
assessed contributions available for emergency response, the more slowly the WHO and its 
Member States should respond (H5a). I find that the worst-affected states, Brazil and Colombia, 
did not receive additional resources in the form of assessed contributions. This is likely due to 
my earlier findings that suggest WHO Member States did not view Zika as a security threat.  
The PAHO receives 2.8 percent ($111.01 million USD) of the total overall WHO budget, 
which includes both assessed and voluntary contributions alongside contributions from local 
governments, partnerships, UN organizations, and philanthropic foundations (WHO, 2016f). The 
PAHO budget includes 54.1 percent ($33.72 million USD) assessed contributions from Member 
States; 6.8 percent ($4.22 million USD) of contributions are in the form of voluntary-specified 
contributions; and the remainder of the PAHO budget comes from the other categories 
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mentioned above (WHO, 2016f). The rest of the budget allocated for the Americas ($111.01 
million USD) was distributed among the Member States within the WHO Americas region 
(WHO, 2016f).  The PAHO’s largest budget category was 20.9 percent ($7.59 million USD) 
spent on management and administration, with the third largest category being outbreak and 
crisis response, which received 7.2 percent ($2.72 million USD) of the PAHO budget (WHO, 
2016f). No other subcategories within the Preparedness, Preparedness, Surveillance and 
Response budgetary category are currently active within the PAHO’s 2016-2017 budget (WHO, 
2016f).  
Given the large number of countries that experienced, and continue to experience, local 
transmission, I focus on the country office budgets for Brazil and Colombia, given that Brazil 
was the epicenter of the outbreak and Colombia experienced a rise in the number of cases of 
microcephaly and GBS (CBS, 2016). Brazil’s country office received $2.55 million USD, 
however it implemented only $98,000 USD worth of programs. The majority of its budget (61.9 
percent, or $1.58 million USD) came from assessed contributions, while only 0.9 percent 
($23,710 USD) came from voluntary-specified contributions (WHO, 2016f). Notably, 
Programme support costs (which were funded entirely by assessed contributions) and 
philanthropic foundations contributed more to the Brazilian country office’s budget than 
voluntary-specified contributions from Member States. This is in stark contrast to the country 
offices in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea that relied heavily on voluntary-specified 
contributions with very little assessed contributions at their disposal. One hundred percent of 
Brazil’s voluntary-specified contributions came from donations from the United States and 
Norway that totaled $23,710 USD, of which Brazil spent $18,660 USD on outbreak and crisis 
response (WHO, 2016f). Brazil’s top spending category was management and administration 
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(39.5 percent, $390,000 USD) and malaria (16.3 percent, $161,200 USD) (WHO, 2016f). Others 
included neglected tropical diseases (7 percent, $69,450 USD) and tuberculosis (6.8 percent, 
$67,230 USD) (WHO, 2016f).   
Colombia’s budget for 2016-2017 was comprised of 90.8 percent ($2.11 million USD) 
assessed contributions and only 0.4 percent ($8,700 USD) voluntary-specified contributions 
(WHO, 2016f). Larger categories of funding included programme support costs (3.3 percent, 
$7,770 USD), philanthropic foundations philanthropic foundations (2.1 percent, $49,370 USD), 
private sector entities (1.6 percent, $37,000 USD), and partnerships (1 percent, $24,000USD) 
(WHO, 2016f). Colombia, however only implemented $1.07 million in programs for 2016-2017 
(WHO, 2016f). Its voluntary-specified contributions mainly went to outbreak and crisis response 
(70.7 percent, $4.13 million USD), and non-communicable diseases (29.3 percent, $1,710 USD) 
used up the rest of these funds (WHO, 2016f). The assessed contributions were provided by the 
United Kingdom (65.5 percent) and Brazil (34.5 percent) (WHO, 2016f). Colombia’s assessed 
contributions were mainly used for budget categories such as social determinants of health (17.1 
percent, $147,390 USD), management and administration (14.3 percent, $123,690 USD) and 
people-centered health services (13.8 percent, $119,250USD) (WHO, 2016f). Outbreak and 
crisis response—or any other Preparedness, Surveillance and Response sub-categories—did not 
receive any assessed contributions. 
Although the PAHO is comprised of Member States who all have their own country 
offices and budgets, the PAHO is also resourced by its own charitable foundation, the PAHO 
Foundation. The PAHO Foundation is a non-profit organization independent of the WHO with 
its own board of directors comprised of international health experts, business leaders, and 
academics specializing in public health within the Americas region (PAHO Foundation, 2017a). 
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The PAHO Foundation partners with the PAHO and also works through public-private 
partnerships with large corporations such as GE, Google, Coca Cola, and Pfizer Foundation 
(PAHO Foundation, 2017b). In addition to the PAHO Foundation, the PAHO relies on donations 
from wealthy private individuals and even accepts donations from anyone through the PAHO 
website (PAHO Foundation, 2017c). The PAHO called for a Zika virus campaign on February 
16, 2017 shortly after the WHO declared the PHEIC concerning the clusters of microcephaly and 
GBS in Brazil (PAHO Foundation, 2016). While not the focus of my analysis since the PAHO 
Foundation is not a WHO Member State, it is important to highlight that the PAHO has outside 
sources of funding that are often larger than voluntary-specified contributions from WHO 
Member States. 
Office  Assessed Contributions Voluntary-Specified 
Contributions 
PAHO $33.72 million USD $4.22 million USD 
Brazil $1.58 million USD  $23, 710 USD 
Brazil: Preparedness, Surveillance 
and Response 
No assessed contributions 
spent.  
Outbreak and Crisis Response: $18, 660 
USD 
Colombia $2.11 million USD  $8, 700 USD 
Colombia: Preparedness, 
Surveillance and Response  
No assessed contributions 
spent.  
Outbreak and Crisis Response: $4, 130 
USD  
 
Similar to the Ebola response, the majority of funds allocated to Zika the response came 
almost entirely from voluntary-specified contributions. The Zika response in general, however, 
did not receive similar levels of resources (from inside and outside the WHO) that the 2014 
Ebola response received. Zika-affected countries relied heavily on private organizations and 
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other donors outside of the WHO for funding. Colombia’s budget, though 90.8 percent assessed 
contributions actually had more donations from philanthropic organizations (2.1 percent) and 
private sector entities (1.6 percent) than voluntary-specified contributions from Member States 
(0.4 percent). Likewise, Brazil’s budget was composed of 61.9 percent assessed contributions 
plus 2.8 percent of contributions from philanthropic foundations while only 0.9 percent came 
from voluntary-specified contributions at the WHO. This suggests that the securitization 
explanation may connect with the budget explanation: since Zika was not securitized, but rather 
remained a public health issue, the WHO and its Member States and philanthropic organizations 
did not feel the need to contribute extra resources to the Zika response. Instead, the burden of 
responsibility fell to the affected WHO Member States to control mosquito populations and 
handle the long-term health consequences from the Zika virus.  
 
From the Zika case study I find that Zika’s low lethality, but high transmissibility did not 
have any determinate effect on the speed or response or resources allocated to the response. I 
also find that Zika was not securitized. Actors had framed Zika as a security threat, however the 
security framing did not become the dominant frame. Instead, Zika remained a long-term public 
health issue. Although the outbreak received a quick WHO response, Member States were slow 
to dedicate any funds to the response. I find that decentralization remained the same between the 
two cases and that there was not the same surge in voluntary-specified contributions for outbreak 
and crisis response that occurred in the Ebola case. My findings suggest that the securitization 
and budget mechanisms work together. When securitization happens, it encourages voluntary 
contributions from WHO Member States but when securitization does not occur the affected 
states receive fewer voluntary-specified contributions. In the case of the PAHO and Zika, 
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however, the role of leadership was important for a quick and well-resourced response at the 
regional level.  
In addition to the stronger leadership at the PAHO that contributed to a quicker and more 
resource-plentiful response, it is important to take into consideration the location of the 
respective outbreaks and previous experience with mosquito-borne viruses. Zika occurred in a 
wealthier region with more developed health infrastructure, while Ebola occurred in some of the 
poorest countries in the world that have minimal health infrastructure and resources to spend on 
emergency operations. The second factor to consider is prior experience: many mosquito-borne 
viruses are endemic to the Americas and required specialized emergency responses. Ebola struck 
three West African states with no prior experience with Ebola.   
First, the Zika outbreak occurred in a region with better (though not great) health 
infrastructure than West Africa. Brazil and Colombia have 1.89 doctors per thousand and 1.47 
doctors per thousand, respectively (World Bank Group, 2016). In comparison, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea have 0.01, 0.02, and 0.1 doctors per thousand, respectively (World Bank 
Group, 2016). Second, health authorities at local and national levels, as well as the PAHO at the 
regional level had prior experience with mosquito-borne viruses such as dengue and 
chikungunya, whereas Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea had no previous experience with Ebola 
outbreaks. Prior experience with mosquito-borne viruses in the Americas formed the basis for the 
PAHO’s regional emergency response plan, suggesting that prior experience with a virus can 
impact on response time and coordination.  
Lastly, though I find Zika was not framed as a security issue, the leadership of the PAHO 
was able to draw attention and resources to the cause. The strong and responsive leadership at 
the PAHO initiated a regional response and then called the issue to the attention of the WHO and 
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rest of the international community. The WHO Member States did not respond with the same 
degree of financial resources that they dedicated to the Ebola outbreak, which Member States 
interpreted as a security threat. The attention that the PAHO leadership drew to the Zika 
outbreak, however may have been influential in garnering some resources despite Zika’s status 
as a public health issue.  
 
Conclusion 
 I find that the securitization and budgetary explanations work together in influencing the 
speed of response and resources that the WHO and its Member States allocated to the response. 
When securitization occurs, as in the Ebola case, this encourages WHO Member States to donate 
voluntary contributions to the response. The Ebola response was slow likely because 
securitization is a long process that requires time to frame an issue as a security threat and 
convince the relevant audience that issue is a security threat. When securitization does not 
happen, the WHO’s Member States are less inclined to give more voluntary contributions as the 
disease is perceived as less threatening, thus requiring fewer resources to contain it. I find that 
the role of leadership was important in coordinating a fast response to the Zika outbreak and 
galvanizing some resources when securitization did not occur. African Regional Director, Dr. 
Luis Sambo was complacent as the regional director. He repeatedly ignored calls and emails 
from WHO headquarters and country offices in the region, in turn slowing down the WHO’s 
response time. On the other hand, the Pan-American Regional Director, Dr. Carissa Etienne 
recognized the Zika outbreak shortly after Brazil and Colombia reported sharp increases in the 
number of microcephaly and GBS cases.  Yet, when securitization does not occur a strong leader 
at the regional level, such as Dr. Carissa Etienne at the PAHO, can mobilize attention toward a 
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pandemic outbreak. In the absence of securitizing actors to successfully frame Zika as a security 
threat, Dr. Etienne’s responsive leadership was essential for directing international attention 
toward the Zika outbreak and possibly garnering more resources as a result.  
 I also suggest that the number of doctors per thousand and prior experience with a specific 
disease or mode of transmission is important for coordinating a quick response to a disease 
outbreak. The countries affected by Zika had more doctors per thousand than those countries 
affected by Ebola, suggesting that more doctors per thousand leads to a quicker response. Further 
empirical research on health emergencies is necessary to draw a causal conclusion. The countries 
affected by Zika had prior experience with mosquito-borne viruses, while the countries affected 
by Ebola had never experienced a prior outbreak. The Zika response was modeled on the 
American region’s previous response to other mosquito borne diseases, suggesting that having a 
prior model for pandemic response is useful in shortening response time.  
 In sum, the securitization and budget explanations work together, along with the leadership 
variable that emerges from my case study analysis. Securitization convinces the WHO Member 
States that a health issue constitutes a security threat, which prompts Member States to provide 
additional voluntary contributions to the WHO. Even with irresponsive regional leadership, a 
resource-rich response can occur. In the absence of securitization, however, the affected states 
will not receive as many voluntary contributions from WHO Member States. Responsive 
leadership in this case can direct attention towards the outbreak, and in this way convince 
Member States and other organizations or actors to allocate funds to an outbreak.  
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